

Co-ethnic Bias and Policing in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Travis Curtice*

January 25, 2022

Abstract

Why do people cooperate with police in multiethnic societies? For scholars of comparative politics and international relations, examining the effects of ethnicity on patterns of conflict, cooperation, and state repression remains a foundational endeavor. Studies show individuals who share ethnicity are more likely to cooperate to provide public goods. Yet we do not know whether co-ethnic cooperation extends to the provision of law and order and, if so, why people might cooperate more with co-ethnic police officers. In the context of policing, I theorize co-ethnic bias affects interactions between people and the police because individuals prefer officers who share their ethnicity and fear repression more when encountering non-co-ethnic officers. Using a conjoint experiment in Uganda, I demonstrate that individuals prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers, even after controlling for potential confounders. Broadly, this result is strongest among individuals with no trust in the police, the courts, or the political authorities. These findings have important implications for the politics of policing, conflict, and social order.

Key words: Law and order, police, cooperation, un-consolidated democracies, conjoint experiment, Uganda

*Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Drexel University. Email: tbc52@drexel.edu. *Acknowledgments:* This study would not have been possible without the assistance and support of numerous Ugandans. I thank Jennifer Gandhi, David Davis, Danielle Jung, Pia Raffler, Christian Davenport, Emily Ritter, Cyrus Samii, Michael Gilligan, Adam Glynn, Miguel Rueda, Brandon Behlendorf, Erik Wibbels, Livia Isabella Schubiger, Mai Hassan, Rob Blair, Lucia Tiscornia and participants at the Harvard Experiments Working Group, Emory Comparative Politics Working Group, Duke-Emory Rochester Workshop, the Folke Bernadotte Academy/New York University Workshop on Security Sector Reform and Georgia Area Human Rights Network for comments on research design and previous drafts. I also benefited from helpful comments provided by anonymous referees and the editorial team of JPR. *Replication data:* The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the online appendix, are available at <https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/>. All analyses were conducted using R. *Funding:* I gratefully acknowledge support from the Institute of Developing Nations, Laney Graduate School at Emory University, the Andrew W Mellon Foundation (Mellon PhD Intervention), and the United States Institute of Peace. Data collection software, tablets, and funding also provided by The Carter Center. *Biographical statement:* TRAVIS B CURTICE, b. 1986, PhD in Political Science (Emory University, 2020); Assistant Professor, Drexel University (2021–); research interests: policing, repression, political violence.

Introduction

One of the fundamental roles of government is to provide public goods, such as healthcare and education. Of these goods, the provision of law and order may be one of the most important since without security, citizens live in a state of anarchy (Hobbes, [1651] 1996). In the modern state, the police are the central actor responsible for providing law and order. To prevent and solve crimes, the police critically rely on information supplied by community members, and they can receive this information only if citizens are willing to cooperate with them and provide it (Magaloni & Rodriguez, 2020; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Tyler, 2006). This cooperation involves citizens organizing neighborhood watches, taking note of suspicious activity, and reporting crimes.

Given these requirements for the effective provision of law and order, policing is particularly challenging in multi-ethnic communities. This is especially the case when officers work in areas mostly populated by those who do not share their ethnicity. Research on ethnicity and public goods – while not addressing the provision of law and order directly – would lead us to expect that cooperation would be difficult in such areas (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). Observational studies of policing in multi-ethnic contexts like Israel and Ireland suggest that citizens display the same co-ethnic bias in the provision of law and order as they do in other types of public goods (Nanes, 2020; Weitzer & Hasisi, 2008). Others employing experimental evidence suggest that inclusion of an ethnic outsider in the police force might decrease cooperation among citizens who identify with marginalized officers (Blair et al., forthcoming). Yet, few studies experimentally examine individuals' preferences between police officers they might encounter when reporting crimes.

This article examines whether individuals prefer reporting crimes to police officers who share their ethnicity. And if so, why ethnicity matters during citizen-police interactions? Co-ethnic bias may be the result of simply affinity or of more strategic considerations of citizens who care about their ability to socially sanction free-riding or defection. While these

are important factors, there is a powerful alternative theory that explains co-ethnic bias in cooperation with the police in some states. I argue how individuals from marginalized communities view the criminal justice system and the state more broadly shapes their preference for interacting with a co-ethnic police officer. When political leaders use the police for political purposes in multi-ethnic states, they likely stack the police force with their co-ethnic loyalists or shuffle officers so that the most loyal officers patrol areas with the most political opposition (Blaydes, 2018; Greitens, 2016; Hassan, 2017; Quinlivan, 1999; Roessler, 2011). In either case, the result is that some areas are characterized by police operating in non-co-ethnic communities playing a dual role: providing law and order and repressing political dissent (Curtice, forthcoming; Curtice & Behlendorf, 2021).

For citizens, cooperation with the police then presents a dilemma. People may interact with the police by providing useful information that lowers ordinary crime, but such interactions make individuals more visible to the very agents of repression employed by political authorities. For most citizens who just want to get on with their daily lives, they would rather stay invisible to such actors. I theorize that in multi-ethnic states with politically-employed police, the co-ethnic bias of citizens in their interactions with the police may be motivated not only by affinity or sanctioning concerns (i.e., the reasons identified in the extant literature), but also by their fear and lack of trust in the criminal justice system and their political authorities. Specifically, I argue that given the choice individuals will prefer interacting with police officers from their same ethnic group and that this preference become stronger among those who mistrust the police, the courts, and government.

Studying the politics of policing, especially in politically repressive states, raises similar ethical, logistical, and methodological challenges as conducting research in conflict environments. First, the availability and access to observational data on police activity is limited. Second, the sensitive nature of police interactions renders observational measures of behavior suspect: individuals are unlikely to discuss their “true preferences” relating to police if they

fear potential retaliation, making it difficult to solicit “truthful” responses.¹ Third, given the political context, any study of such a sensitive topic must be careful not to endanger respondents.

To overcome these challenges, I employ a conjoint survey experiment in Uganda to assess whether ethnicity affects people’s preference for interacting with police officers. I approach ethnicity with a bundle of sticks approach to identity (Sen & Wasow, 2016). The conjoint experiment examines individuals’ decision to report crimes between officers who share their ethnicity relative to non-co-ethnic officers. And if so, to what extent mistrust in the political authorities and the police affects that co-ethnic bias. My design allows me to (1) measure the effect of exposure to an ethnic cue and (2) exploit within-group variation of trust to measure the conditional effect of trust on the randomly assigned ethnic cue. In addition to approval from official ethics review boards, I also discussed the study with several local formal and informal authorities before starting the study.² At each site, enumerators also met with village leaders (LC1s), receiving approval before implementing it.

The study provides robust evidence not only of people’s co-ethnic bias in dealing with the police, but also that the strength of this bias is conditioned by people’s level of trust toward the state. In Uganda, respondents who mistrust President Yoweri Museveni and the police and courts — two institutions often used by the government to repress political opponents — have a stronger preference for officers who share their ethnicity. The findings here make an empirical contribution both to studies of ethnic politics and comparative policing. In showing that ethnicity is a much stronger predictor of respondents’ choice over other demographic characteristics of officers and their willingness to pay, I join work that carefully identifies just how strong the pull of ethnicity can be in conflict-affected and non-democratic contexts (Condra & Linardi, 2019; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Lyall, Shiraito & Imai, 2015). I also demonstrate that mistrust in the government broadly increases people’s co-ethnic bias. This

¹Two threats to inference are social desirability bias and preference falsification; respondents say what they think they are supposed to say either to avoid social sanction or gain a reward.

²Gulu University’s Research Ethics Committee (GUREC) (No. GUREC-052-18) and Emory University’s IRB (REF IRB00097514) provided ethics review and approved the study.

suggests that fear does more than deter dissent (Young, 2019), it also adversely affects people’s perception of the police and willingness to interact with state agents.

This account also has ramifications for theoretical approaches to understanding interactions within and across ethnic groups. The source of co-ethnic bias likely depends on the political context of the interaction and legacies of inequality across groups. Studies of police in democracies show that citizens’ cooperation depends on their trust in police (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2006). I show that when police are part of political apparatus, the effect of ethnicity on citizen-police interactions depends on individuals trust in political authorities and institutions, however. Affinity and concerns about sanctioning uncooperative behavior may be generally important. But specific political context – like the police’s repressive role in society – can provide additional reasons for why cooperation among ethnic groups may be difficult to sustain. Assessing the effects of ethnicity and repression in citizen-police interactions is critical to not only our theories of cooperation (Habyarimana et al., 2007) but also non-violent resistance (Manekin & Mitts, forthcoming) and conflict and security more broadly (Denny & Walter, 2014).

In what follows, I elaborate on the argument and follow with a brief discussion on Uganda: the details that both explain its appropriateness as a case and contextualize the conjoint experiment. I then present the experimental design and results, including reviewing various alternative explanations. In the conclusion, I consider the implications of these findings for the effectiveness of police and political leaders in achieving their goals.

Theory

The provision of law and order is one of the most important and basic public goods that the government provides (Hobbes, [1651] 1996; Weber [1946] 1958). Police are the agents tasked with providing it. Yet police officers rely on cooperation from individuals. I define cooperation in this context as citizens working with police (or other state security forces) to

provide law and order. This cooperation includes organizing neighborhood watches, providing information on suspicious activity or persons, and reporting crimes.

Cooperation and co-ethnic bias

The criminology literature – based on the study of police in developed democracies – suggests that people cooperate more with the police when they trust them and view them as legitimate authorities (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Tyler, 2003, 2004). Whether citizens believe police are legitimate depends on how police treat people and exercise their authority (Tyler, 2006). Negative interactions, for example, undermine citizens’ confidence in the police (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Tyler, 2003, 2004). Other studies suggest that police are viewed as less legitimate if they are perceived to not share values with the communities they are policing (Huq, Jackson & Trinkner, 2016; Jackson et al., 2012).³

Cooperation between citizens and police in the provision of law enforcement is especially tricky in multi-ethnic states in which political leaders have not displayed a commitment to democratic turnover in office (e.g., unconsolidated democracies and dictatorships) and use the police and other criminal justice institutions like the courts for political ends.⁴ Even if individuals do not directly experience abuse, street-level repression by the police negatively affects public perceptions of the police (Curtice, *forthcoming*), decreasing support for the police and increasing people’s willingness to engage in public dissent (Curtice & Behlendorf, 2021). In these settings, ethnic identity influences the behavior of actors at all levels due to perceived co-ethnic bias. Co-ethnic bias is defined as individuals’ systematic tendency to prefer members of their own group relative to members of another (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). For political leaders who are trying to remain in power (often against popular will), the police are an important institution by which they can monitor, control, and repress political opposition (Curtice, *forthcoming*). To ensure that the police – and other parts of

³In the United States, there is a wide gap between how much Black, Native American, and Latinx individuals trust and support the police compared to white individuals, as minoritized communities are less likely to express trust in the police (Garofalo, 1977; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Schuman, 1997; Tyler, 2005).

⁴See Magaloni (2008); Shen-Bayh (2018).

the security apparatus – serve as a reliable pillar of their rule, leaders in multi-ethnic states frequently over-staff these institutions with loyalists from their (or allied) ethnic groups (Greitens, 2016; Quinlivan, 1999; Roessler, 2011). When demographic limitations make stacking difficult, leaders can resort to shuffling around officers so that dissident areas are policed by loyalists, particularly during politically sensitive moments (Hassan, 2017).

For police officers, their behavior towards citizens may be conditional on whether they share ethnic ties. The broader literature on ethnic politics suggests that co-ethnics may be more willing to cooperate with each other due to affinity or strategic considerations (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Even in high-risk settings, such as conflict and civil resistance, identity considerations still affect people’s attitudes and behaviors (Arriola, 2013; Lyall, Shiraito & Imai, 2015; Manekin & Mitts, forthcoming). In this context, police officers may be *more* willing to solve crimes on behalf of their co-ethnics and *less* willing to repress them. It is precisely for the latter reason that leaders engage in stacking and shuffling.

For citizens, ethnicity affects their beliefs about the role of police in the community (Blair et al., forthcoming; Haim, Nanes & Davidson, forthcoming). People might expect co-ethnic police will exert more effort for a co-ethnic or that co-ethnic officers will be more effective.⁵ Additionally, people might have the expectation that a co-ethnic officer will be less likely to extort bribes from a co-ethnic. Finally, people might just have some affection or affinity for co-ethnic officers rooted in shared ethnic ties. These explanations dovetail with more general arguments about the role of ethnicity, cooperation and the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Habyarimana et al., 2007). In general, we should expect individuals to prefer cooperating with co-ethnics in the provision of law and order because they believe co-ethnics will be more helpful or more effective relative to a non-co-ethnic officer.

The emerging research on this topic is mixed, however. Haim, Nanes & Davidson (forth-

⁵Co-ethnic officers might engender cooperation from potential witnesses because they speak the same language and are embedded in the same social networks.

coming) suggest there are limits on cooperation by increasing officer embeddedness – family ties – in communities. Others find that individuals from marginalized communities might even be less cooperative with police officers who share their ethnicity (Blair et al., forthcoming). The effect of ethnicity on public perceptions of the police and their preferences between officers they interact with remain open questions.

Repressive institutions, trust, and ethnicity

The added wrinkle for citizens in non-democracy is that individuals are aware of the dual role of police. The police are there to provide law enforcement to the benefit of the community, but they also monitor and control dissent to the benefit of the political authorities. Interacting with police – by providing information and organizing neighborhood watches – may help the community but also makes individuals more known and visible to agents of repression. So civilians must weigh whether they believe police officers they encounter serve as “street level bureaucrats” providing security as a public good (Lipsky, 1971) or repressive agents ensuring the incumbent’s survival (Blaydes, 2018; Greitens, 2016; Hassan, 2017).

The central institutions responsible for maintaining the political status quo in autocracies and ensuring the regime’s political survival are the incumbent executive, the ruling party, and various repressive institutions used by the autocrat including the police, military, and the courts. Some of these institutions like the police and military engage directly in state repression such as violations of physical integrity rights. While the military are governments’ repressive agents of last resorts (Svolik, 2009), the police are the state’s primary agent of repression in day-to-day political affairs (Curtice & Behlendorf, 2021; Davenport, 2020). Repression by these institutions negatively affects public perceptions of their legitimacy undermining people’s trust in them (Curtice, forthcoming). Other institutions like the courts use their power in more indirect ways to punish political opponents (Magaloni, 2008; Shen-Bayh, 2018). As a consequence, some individuals – especially those opposed to the political status quo – distrust not only the autocrat but also these various institutions. Citizens’ trust

in political authorities such as the executive and institutions tasked with repressing dissent like the police and the courts is important because citizens observe leaders using the courts and the police to serve their own ends often excluding marginalized communities.

In this context, I argue ethnic identity functions as a cue for citizens. Shared ethnicity engenders beliefs that the officers are likely to be more effective in helping them and to treat them well. In other words, when encountering officers who share their ethnicity, people should be more confident of the officers' role to provide safety and security. People who distrust the incumbent including how they employ the police and courts will be especially concerned about encountering non-co-ethnic officers as they already have strong priors about their function as agents of repression. For citizens, this reasoning for favoring co-ethnics exists not only for reasons of affinity or effectiveness, but also due to fear and distrust in the police and political authorities.

Especially in authoritarian contexts like Uganda, I theorize that mistrust has a conditional effect on co-ethnic bias on citizen-police interactions. People who mistrust the regime should be less willing to make themselves vulnerable to the police unless they are co-ethnic police officers who they expect will be more helpful and present a lower risk of repression. When citizens mistrust their leaders fearing repression, their distrust of non-co-ethnic police is magnified. So while I argue there is a baseline tendency to favor interaction with co-ethnics (due to affinity and concerns about effectiveness), this bias is exacerbated among those who are especially fearful of the regime and its security apparatus. The logic that mistrust in government increases co-ethnic bias in policing likely extends to some democracies, especially states with salient ethnic or racial divisions and a history of state violence against minority groups to suppress voter turnout or restrict freedom of movement and other forms of political expression (Soss & Weaver, 2017). This sentiment is reflected in James Baldwin's essay, *A Report from Occupied Territory*. Reporting on police abuse of Black communities in the United States, Baldwin (1966) wrote: 'The police are simply the hired enemies of this population.' The police are present to keep the community members in their place and

‘protect white business interests.’

Consequently, I argue that fear of repression and distrust shapes perceptions of the police, including co-ethnic bias which affects people’s perception of police and their preferences to cooperate with individuals officers more than others. Specifically, I hypothesize: (1) people will prefer to report crimes to co-ethnic police officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers, and (2) the effects of ethnicity will increase in magnitude with greater degrees of mistrust in the police and mistrust in political authorities.

The case of Uganda

I test my theory with evidence from Uganda. Uganda is an ethnically diverse society (See Table II in the online appendix). There are at least 65 ethnic groups in Uganda. Ethnic-related conflicts have shaped Uganda since independence in 1962, including a series of military coups and violent regime changes.

Repression and the police

Previous regimes in Uganda including those led by Milton Obote and Idi Amin ethnically stacked their security forces with loyalists to maintain power (Kasozi, 1994). Until the current administration, the security forces were composed predominantly of Langi and Acholi officers from northern Uganda. Similar to the previous regimes, the current regime is led by political authorities who frequently rely on security forces to repress political opposition. The president, Yoweri Museveni and the incumbent political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) have maintained control since 1986.⁶ When the current regime took power, the political authorities purged the Uganda Police Force (UPF) of those loyal to the previous administrations, reducing the number of police officers from about approximately

⁶President Museveni is from the Banyankole (father) and Banyarwanda (mother) ethnic groups. Both ethnic groups are subgroups of the Bantu peoples. The Baganda ethnic group is Uganda’s largest ethnic group, composing approximately 16.5% of Uganda’s population.

10,000 to 3,000. Langi and Acholi officers with ties to Okello or Obote were disbanded and replaced. Between 1986 to 2005, the police force grew from 3,000 to 14,000 (UPF, 2019). Especially in the early years of the NRM, the security forces were primarily recruited from the Bantu peoples, including ethnic groups such as the Baganda, Banyankole, Banyoro, Bakonjo, Basoga, and Bakiga among others. As the regime restaffed the police force, they had to include individuals from numerous ethnic groups. The police force increased to approximately 44,898 officers by April 2016.⁷ Theories of ethnic stacking would expect that Museveni would stack his personal security apparatus with co-ethnics in order to police Uganda. Due to the size of his ethnic group, composing under 10% of the population, Museveni has to enlist people from other ethnic groups.⁸ Data on the ethnic composition and rotation of deployments are not available but evidence gathered from newspaper reports and interviews conducted in 2018 with UPF officers shows the government regularly shuffles both junior and senior UPF officers.

The Inspector General of Police (IGP) leads the UPF while under the direct control of the president. The former IGP Kale Kayihura was the chief architect establishing the UPF as the go-to repressive apparatus for the government. He served thirteen years as IGP until Museveni fired him. Kayihura was viewed as the most powerful security agent in Uganda because of his work politicizing the police to repress political dissent and because he supposedly was not interested in becoming president. Kayihura ordered police officers to beat political opponents and more broadly was responsible for implementing the controversial Public Order Management Act, which was used to target opposition politicians and their rights to assemble. Kayihura frequently shuffled police officers like the 70 highly ranked police officers he shuffled in April 2017 (*Daily Monitor*, 2018). After Kayihura was removed,

⁷In preparation for the 2021 presidential election, the UPF recruited an additional 4,500 officers. The police spokesperson said that only 195 recruits will be selected from the Acholi Sub-region, reflecting the under-representation of northern Ugandans within the police force (Ocungi, 2019). The Acholi Sub-region is one of 15 Sub-regions in Uganda and composes approximately 4.8% of the population and eight districts: Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Lamwo, Pader, Kitgum, Nwoya, and Omoro.

⁸Museveni is unable to staff the entire police force with Banyankole officers. Beyond his presidential guard, Museveni could conceivably stack elite squads within the police force like the rapid response or flying squad units – the latter only had 161 officers in 2016.

the pattern of repression and strategic shuffling continued. The new IGP Okoth Ochola often shuffles officers, for example, including 96 senior police officers in April 2018 (The Observer, 2018) and 142 senior officers in police transfers in January 2019 (Kazibwe, 2019).

The police are the security sector most likely to engage in the daily activities associated with repressing dissent (Amnesty International, 2019; Curtice, forthcoming). From January 1997 to July 2018 (See Figure 3 in the online appendix), data show that the security forces were collectively involved in 2,377 events of political violence and social unrest, with the police involved in 30% of them (Raleigh et al., 2010). The ACLED data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression. The military conducted more political violence events than the police but nearly all (94.2%) were battle-related or remote violence events rather than events typically associated with state repression. A vast majority (87%) of those involving the police are categorized as events related to state repression.

One prominent example of police abuse occurred in Kayunga in 2009. Security forces consisting primarily of police officers used live fire to deter protests in Kayunga. Hospitals in the area reported treating more than 88 victims following the violence, the vast majority for gunshot wounds. The official government statement was that 27 people died resulting from security forces' "stray bullets" (Barnett, 2018), although some estimate more than 40 died. Rather than investigating the excessive use of force, police targeted protesters, arresting almost 850 citizens suspected of participating in the unrest (Barnett, 2018). Other examples of state repression by the police include human rights abuses of political opponents often around elections (Amnesty International, 2019; Grasse et al., 2021).

Not only are the police the primary repressive apparatus of the state, Ugandans see the police as a political tool under the direct control of the president and his ruling party, which shapes how they view them (Curtice, forthcoming). Some studies in Uganda highlight the role of the informal security sector, including militias, vigilantes, and community policing initiatives as more arbitrary forms of governance to sustain Museveni's control (Tapscott, 2021). Others focus on the relationship between police repression, authoritarian survival,

and public perceptions of the rule of law. Curtice & Behlendorf (2021) find that excessive police force at a rally decreases people’s support of the police and increases their willingness to publicly criticize or protest the police’s actions. Curtice (forthcoming) demonstrates that repression by the police in Uganda against opposition leaders negatively affects public perceptions of police.

Ethnicity and distrust: Gulu district

Within Uganda, I administered the study in Gulu district for three main reasons. First, it is an area dominated by one ethnic group: the Acholi. Second, the Acholi are historically in opposition to Museveni. Third, there is within-group variation in how people view the regime because of the civil war. This enables me to examine ethnicity through a bundle of sticks approach measuring the effect of exposure to a co-ethnic officer while exploiting within-group variation in trust, which allows me to measure the conditional effect of trust on co-ethnic bias (Sen & Wasow, 2016).

When Museveni came to power, tensions grew between the political authorities and ethnic groups in northern Uganda. Museveni and the NRM came to power after ousting president Tito Okello who is from the Acholi ethnic group. Broadly, the Acholi people had been loyal to the previous Obote administration until two Acholi Commanders, Bazilio Olara-Okello and Tito Lutwa Okello, launched the 1985 coup that ousted president Milton Obote. Tito Okello took control of the country and ruled as president for six months until he was overthrown by the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni. Museveni’s regime sparked a spate of insurgencies throughout the north. Most notably the rebellion led by Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army, which was largely composed of Acholi fighters. The war affected northern Uganda for over twenty years. As a result of the conflict, over an estimated 1.2 million people were forced into internally displacement camps. The conflict between the government and the LRA further escalated in 2002, when the army launched “Operation Iron Fist,” a large-scale offensive, against the LRA bases in southern Sudan. During this

escalation, the Acholi communities experienced sustained abuse and human rights violations from both the insurgents and the government forces (Finnström, 2008). Although Joseph Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement, the Juba Peace Talks, unfolding from July 2006 to April 2008, largely brought an end to the conflict.

In Gulu district, there is important in-group variation in the way people view the conflict and attribute blame. On one hand, some people blame the rebels for the civilian victimization that occurred during the conflict. On the other, people express frustration in the government for directly committing abuse and for failing to protect them. Broadly, the district remains an opposition stronghold and people there express ongoing concern about the human rights abuses committed by security forces in the country.⁹ But, there is a sizeable level of support for the incumbent government among those who credit the government for bringing stability and ending the conflict. Moreover, the political authorities have recruited additional police officers from the north as political opposition has increased in other areas of Uganda. By studying policing in Gulu district, I am able to examine co-ethnic bias and within-group variation of individuals' level of mistrust in the government.¹⁰

A conjoint experiment

Co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions might exist for several reasons. I theorize that people's security dilemma when interacting with police in unconsolidated democracies and autocracies likely amplifies it. In general, people are likely to prefer reporting crimes to officers who share their ethnicity. However, concerns about repression should increase co-

⁹Only 32.7% of Gulu district voted for Museveni in the 2016 election. Most Acholi in Gulu traditionally support opposition parties; however, there is within ethnic group variation in people's level of trust in the regime.

¹⁰Comparing co-ethnic bias between Acholi (the main ethnic group in Gulu) and Banyankole (Museveni's ethnic group) would be theoretically ideal. Recent political unrest precluded me from using Museveni's ethnic group. A more socially sensitive approach was to test focus on a different ethnic group rather than Museveni's, specifically the relationship between the Acholi and Baganda ethnic groups. The Baganda ethnic group is the most populous and a likely source for police recruits. To the extent that co-ethnic bias operates through the mistrust mechanism associated with outsiders potentially using repression, this design biases against finding support, compared to if I used Museveni's ethnic group.

ethnic bias, especially among those who mistrust the police, political authorities, or the judiciary. This study tests these two observable implications.

Sample and data

This study was administered in 45 parishes across 22 sub-counties of Gulu district, Uganda.¹¹ The sample includes 983 household surveys. Data were collected in October 2018 and February 2019, using structured questionnaires with face-to-face interviews conducted by a well-respected Ugandan non-governmental organization. Enumerators rotated male and female respondents to ensure that the sample was balanced with an equal number of male and female participants. The study collected pre-test data on how respondents perceive the relationship between the community and police, their level of institutional trust in police and other government institutions, their level of political engagement, and various other relevant demographics. By design, the study focuses on Acholi respondents reducing the sample to 937 participants.

Among the sample, there is important variation in how people view broader patterns of cooperation between the police and the community. When asked if they agree that the police work together with community members to solve local problems, 33.4% and 4.7% of the sample disagreed or strongly disagreed. 38.1% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the police care about the concerns of the community members. Additionally, 43% of the sample do not think the police make it easy for community members to provide input (e.g., sharing comments, suggestions, and concerns). Importantly, when asked whether they agreed or disagreed that the police treat everyone the same regardless of their ethnicity, 46.3% and 14.0% of the sample either disagreed or strongly disagreed.

¹¹In the online appendix, I further elaborate on my sample selection and rationale for conducting the study in Gulu district.

Experimental design

To isolate the effects of co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions, this study focuses on individuals' decisions between police officers when reporting a crime rather than their decision to report a crime in the first place. Although the initial decision to go to the police is important, this study examines individuals' stated preferences between officers. This potentially limits the scope of the findings, but this design was necessary to ensure greater participation in the study and reduce non-responses.¹²

The study employs a choice-based conjoint design to explore whether ethnicity affects individuals' attitudes and behavior towards the police. The experiment has respondents imagine that they have experienced a robbery and then asks them to decide between pairs of police officers at the police station to whom they would report the crime. Officer profiles were randomly assigned along five relevant attributes: ethnicity, gender, age, rank, and willingness to pay for information. Additionally, I vary the ethnicity of the robber by using geographic cues. The decision to include each of these attributes was motivated by theoretical considerations that allow me to rule out alternative theories for why ethnicity might matter and to provide information that people would likely know when encountering police officers.

Rather than explicitly cuing ethnicity, I employ surnames and geographical cues as contextual indicators for ethnicity.¹³ Surnames signal ethnicity and gender. Odong and Adong, for example, signal a male and female officer from the respondents' Acholi ethnic group. Kato and Nakato cue a male and female officer who is from the Baganda ethnic group.¹⁴

Participants were read the following prompt:

Prompt: This study considers how communities report crime to the police. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to imagine that you were recently robbed. You know where the robber might be from but do not know the robber. You plan to go to the police station to report the details of the robbery. When you go to the police station to report the

¹²The concern was that participants would select not to go to police; whereas, the objective of the study is to examine co-ethnic bias given an interaction with police officers.

¹³Ethnic affiliation in Uganda are strongly associated with both names and regions (Carlson, 2015). Post-test questions showed individuals were mostly able to identify the ethnicity of the surnames used. Approximately, 98% of Acholi respondents identified the Acholi surnames as Acholi and about 76% identified the Buganda surname.

¹⁴Plural members of the Baganda ethnic group are Baganda; however, a single member is Muganda.

crime, there will be two police officers. You will find out some basic information about these officers and you will need to decide to which officer you would prefer to report the robbery. The activity is purely hypothetical. Even if you aren't entirely sure, please indicate which of the two officers you prefer.

Respondents were presented the profiles of two police officers and geographical origin of two robbers.

After reading the scenario profiles, they were asked the following question:

Question: If you had to choose between them at the station, which of these two officers would you personally prefer reporting the crime to?

Respondents answered by selecting Officer 1 or Officer 2. For each comparison, I randomly assign the geographical origin of the robber and the attributes of each police officer to ensure variation within and across comparisons. Table I provides the list of attributes for the study.¹⁵ Officer attributes randomly vary for each profile and respondents indicate which officer to whom they would prefer reporting, given the varying attributes.

Table I. Attributes for Conjoint Experiment

Officer's ethnicity (name)	Non-co-ethnic officer (Nakato/Kato) Co-ethnic officer (Adong/Odong)
Rank	Junior Officer Senior Officer
Pays reward for information	Always Very often Sometimes Rarely Never
Age	23 35 47
Gender	Male Female
Robber's geographical origin	Mukono (non-co-ethnic) Pader (Coethnic)

Note: This table shows the attribute values used to generate the police officer profiles for the conjoint experiment and the robber's geographic origin.

¹⁵Theoretically, there are 480 unique police officer profiles. English prompt and directions provided. Face-to-face interviews conducted in Acholi, English or both, depending on the preference of the respondent.

Analysis and results

Each respondent, denoted as i , is presented with K choice tasks, and in each of their tasks the respondent chooses the most preferred of J alternatives. Each choice alternative is a profile. The unit of analysis is the rated police officer profile. Each respondent completed five choice tasks generating 10 alternative profiles. For the conjoint analysis, data are subset to include only respondents who are Acholi, leaving 937 respondents (95.3% of participants) and 9,370 observations for the study.¹⁶

Using Equation 1, I estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), clustering robust standard errors at the respondent-level for accurate variance estimates.¹⁷

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Police Officer}_{ijk} = & \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{Co-ethnic officer}_{ijt}] + \theta_2[\text{Senior}_{ijk}] + \theta_3[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 35] \\
 & + \theta_4[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 47] + \theta_5[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Rarely}] + \theta_6[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Sometimes}] \\
 & + \theta_7[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Very Often}] + \theta_8[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Always}] \\
 & + \theta_9[\text{Robber}_{ijk} = \text{Pader}] + \epsilon_{ijk}
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In Equation 1, the dependent variable is an indicator variable, coded as 1 if *Police Officer*_{ijk} is selected and 0 otherwise and each of the independent variables are binary indicators. The main theoretical variable of interest is *Co-ethnic officer*_{ijt}, coded as 1 if the officer is Acholi and 0 otherwise.¹⁸ The main estimator of interest is θ_1 . The reference category is a non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic.

Figure 1 shows the AMCEs from the baseline model with 95% confidence intervals.¹⁹ As hypothesized, people prefer reporting crimes to officers who share their ethnicity relative to

¹⁶The objective was to survey Acholi respondents; only 4.7% of respondents were not Acholi.

¹⁷AMCEs show the average difference in the probability that a police officer is selected when comparing the variants of an attribute (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto, 2014).

¹⁸The randomization did not involve any restrictions on the possible attribute combinations, meaning the attributes are mutually independent.

¹⁹Table VI in the online appendix provides tabular results.

non-co-ethnic officers. A co-ethnic officer is 10.92 percentage points (SE=1.27) more likely to be selected than a non-co-ethnic officer.²⁰ Considering the other officer characteristics provides additional information about respondents’ preferences. First, senior officers were 3.44 percentage points (SE=1.35) more likely to be selected compared to junior officers. Second, respondents preferred older officers. Relative to the 23 year old baseline officer, respondents preferred 35 and 47 year old officers 4.67 percentage points (SE = 1.28) and 4.22 percentage points (SE = 1.34) more, respectively. Fourth, whether officers paid for information had less of an effect on selection; however, respondents were more likely to prefer officers who always paid rewards for information 3.15 percentage points (SE = 1.90), compared to officers who never pay for information.




Figure 1. Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent
Note: This plot shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned officer attribute values on the probability of being selected by respondent. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic.

Broadly, these findings suggest that people prefer reporting to officers who have more experience and are motivated, in part, by material incentives. The conjoint analysis demonstrates that co-ethnic bias strongly predicts officer selection. Even after controlling for several confounders, Acholi respondents stated a significant preference for co-ethnic police officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers. Interestingly, the robber’s ethnicity is insignificant sug-

²⁰The results are robust to estimating each officer name separately. See Table VIII in the online appendix.

gesting that co-ethnic bias matters for interactions with police officer more than concerns about the ethnic identity of those committing the crime.

Conditional effects of mistrust

Next, using pre-test measures of respondents' trust in political institutions, I examine the conditional effects of trust on co-ethnic bias. I hypothesize that co-ethnic bias should increase among those who mistrust the political authorities or the police.

There is variation in people's level of trust in political authorities. When asked about their level of trust, respondents had four response categories: no trust, a little trust, quite a bit of trust, and a lot of trust. 20.4% of the sample said they do not trust the president at all with 20.7%, 25.9% and 31.9% of the sample saying they had a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in him, respectively. The distributions of responses in the level of trust in the police and the courts are similar. 20.4% of the sample do not trust the police at all with 22.7%, 38.2%, and 18.0% of the sample expressing a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in the police. Whereas, 20.8% of the sample said they have no trust in the courts with 20.5%, 35.4%, and 17.4% of the sample expressing a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in the courts.²¹ I construct a series of binary variables for each of these categories of trust re-coding the categories no trust, a little trust, quite a bit of trust, and a lot of trust as no, low, medium, and high, respectively.

Next, I construct three binary variables to capture any level of trust in these respective political authorities: the incumbent, the police, and the courts. *No Trust* is coded as 1 if the respondent said they have no trust in the respective institution and 0 if they expressed any level of trust in that institution.

To assess whether the effects of ethnicity increase among those who mistrust political authorities, I estimate several models that interact the respondents levels of trust with the

²¹Some respondents refused to answer the questions. Ten people did not answer whether they trusted the president, six people did not answer whether they trust the police, and 55 did not answer regarding the courts. Non-responses are excluded from the analysis.

profile attributes. I hypothesized that we should observe a positive effect on co-ethnic bias for those who have no trust in the political authorities and the police. As shown in the top plot of Figure 2, there is evidence that prior levels of trust in Museveni, the courts, and the police have conditional effects on co-ethnic bias.²² The results are as expected, people who said they have no trust in the police, the president, and the courts have a stronger preference for officers who share their ethnicity. People who express no trust in the police (solid circles) prefer a co-ethnic officer 16.95 percentage points (SE=2.87) more than a non-co-ethnic officer.

A similar trend holds among those with no trust in the president (solid triangle) and the courts (solid squares). Respondents with no trust in the president preferred officers who shared their ethnicity 16.54 percentage points (SE=2.77) more than a non-co-ethnic officer. Additionally, participants with no trust in the courts preferred officers who shared their ethnicity 16.55 percentage points (3.05) more than a non-co-ethnic officer. Comparatively, people who expressed any level of trust in the president, the police, or the courts still preferred co-ethnic officers 9.45 percentage points (SE=1.45), 9.38 percentage points (SE=1.42), and 8.17 percentage points (SE=1.42) more than non-co-ethnic officers, respectively.

These results support more general arguments about the role of ethnicity, cooperation and the provision of public goods. However, this only captures part of the story. The interaction terms suggest that mistrust in each of these institutions has a conditional effect on co-ethnic bias, increasing people's preference for selecting an officer who shares their ethnicity. Differences between the conditional effects are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).²³ Comparing those with no trust to those with any level of trust demonstrates that mistrust in police, political authorities, and the courts also increases co-ethnic bias.

The results are mixed when comparing co-ethnic bias among those with no trust and the disaggregated levels of trust (shown in the bottom plot of Figure 2).²⁴ Broadly, as hypothesized, co-ethnic bias is highest among those with no trust in the police, the president,

²²Table VI in the online appendix provides the tabular results for the top figure.

²³In each of these models, the interaction terms are both substantively and statistically significant.

²⁴Table VII in the online appendix provides the tabular results for the bottom figure.

and the courts. Interacting co-ethnic officers and respondents' level of trust, co-ethnic bias decreases by the other levels of trust: low ($\theta = -5.90$, $SE=3.83$), medium ($\theta = -8.71$, $SE=3.58$), and high ($\theta = -6.88$, $SE=4.10$).

The trend is similar comparing those with no trust in the president. Relative to no trust, co-ethnic bias decreases when people express trust in the president: low ($\theta = -6.19$, $SE=4.25$), medium ($\theta = -4.64$, $SE=3.51$), and high ($\theta = -9.61$, $SE=3.58$). Again, mistrust in courts has similar conditional effects on co-ethnic bias. Relative to those with no trust in the courts, co-ethnic bias also decreases: low ($\theta = -4.51$, $SE=4.06$), medium ($\theta = -10.93$, $SE=3.68$), and high ($\theta = -7.90$, $SE=4.17$).

Across all specifications, people prefer co-ethnic officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers, regardless of their level of trust in the police, the president, and the courts. Generally, lacking trust in these institutions increases co-ethnic bias. It is worth noting that these results are suggestive as individuals' levels of trust in these institutions are not randomly assigned.




Figure 2. Conditional Effects of Trust in Police and Political Authorities on Co-ethnic Bias
Note: This plot shows the conditional effects of trust on co-ethnic bias. AMCEs are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic. Only AMCEs for co-ethnic officer coefficients are shown by respondents' level of trust in police (circle), president (triangle), and courts (square).

Discussion

These results speak to several possible mechanisms of co-ethnic bias in people's selection between police officers. First, people likely have some affection or affinity for co-ethnic officers rooted in shared ethnic ties. This broadly comports with existing theories of ethnicity and cooperation in the provision of public goods. My theory builds on this underlying expectation of ethnic affinity. In fact, this is one of the reason why political authorities in unconsolidated democracies and autocracies stack and shuffle their security forces. Moving police officers from one area to police another decreases their social ties and makes it more likely that they will follow orders to repress. This analysis shows that given the opportunity people select officers who share their ethnicity and co-ethnic bias is robust across models.

Second, affinity and social sanctioning mechanisms might explain some of the observed co-ethnic bias (Habyarimana et al., 2009). If co-ethnic bias operates through beliefs about effectiveness or social sanctioning, we should observe variation in people's beliefs based on which officer would be more effective at investigating crimes. Including the ethnicity of the robber allows me to test whether co-ethnic bias varies when the officer and criminal share ethnicity. If this matters, Acholi respondents should prefer a Muganda officer if the robber was Muganda. Counter to these expectations, respondents strictly preferred officers who shared their ethnicity. So it is not likely that people believed that a Muganda officer would have ties within their community that would help them more effectively find and apprehend a Muganda suspect.

Third, people might expect co-ethnic officers to be less likely to extort bribes from a co-ethnic. Some of these results might provide support for this alternative mechanism – people are more concerned about extortion when encountering non-co-ethnic officers. This would suggest two possible reasons why people with no trust in the police are more likely to prefer co-ethnic police officers. First, people might expect that co-ethnic officers will be less likely to extort them. Second, people might expect that non-co-ethnic officers are more willing to repress them. However, an explanation of co-ethnic bias focusing on extortion does not

explain why co-ethnic bias increases among those who mistrust the president or the courts. Whereas, mistrust in the political objectives of these institutions does.

Fourth, it is possible that mistrust in general might shape co-ethnic bias, especially if concerns of repression is one of the mechanisms driving it. In non-democracies, political authorities often rely on information from individuals to monitor behavior. In such environments, mistrust in general might affect co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interaction. Especially in an ethnically homogeneous area, mistrust of neighbors (who are mostly co-ethnics) should decrease co-ethnic bias; whereas, mistrust of strangers (who might be co-ethnics or non-co-ethnics) should increase it. I examine whether the effects of ethnicity increase or decrease depending on people's level of trust in either their neighbors or strangers. Figure 4 of the online appendix shows that mistrust of neighbors appears to decrease co-ethnic bias while mistrust of strangers increases it. This raises important questions regarding within-group variation in how people view one another and their relationship to the state, especially in communities exposed to violence and repression.

Implications and conclusion

In this paper, I contribute to the literature on ethnicity and cooperation, both theoretically and empirically, by using a conjoint experiment in an unconsolidated democracy to demonstrate how co-ethnic bias and trust in political institutions affect people's preferences for police officers. The results of the study demonstrate that people prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers. I show co-ethnic bias is a stronger predictor of why respondents selected to report a crime to an officer than other attributes including: rank, age, gender, and willingness to pay rewards for information. Additionally, participants preferred co-ethnic officers, regardless of the ethnicity of the criminal.

Moreover, the findings show that co-ethnic bias also depends on the political context of the interactions. In un-consolidated democracies and autocracies, the police are part of

the political apparatus. As a consequence, people who mistrust the government exhibit more co-ethnic bias in their interactions with officers. Certainly, affinity and the ability to sanction uncooperative behavior is also important, but political considerations provide additional reasons why inter-group cooperation is difficult to sustain.

One limitation is the study's focus on a narrow form of citizen cooperation with police (i.e., reporting crime). Certainly, cooperation with police involves a broader set of actions, including: neighborhood watches, community policing initiatives, and other more reactive and proactive ways communities partner with law enforcement. Although I expect a similar pattern of co-ethnic bias to emerge in these broader forms of cooperation, this study does not provide empirical evidence on these forms of cooperation. Future studies could examine the extent to which co-ethnic cooperation is sustained in other forms of cooperation and how they relate to informal provisions of security.

Broadly, these findings have implications for the politics of policing and the provision of public goods more broadly. The results suggest that the struggle of political authorities for political survival is at tension with their ability to provide law and order as a public good. This underscores a costly tradeoff for political authorities between repressing dissent and providing law and order. One implication from these results is that the more leaders coopt the police to repress dissent the more it negatively affects their ability to provide law and order. In particular, if leaders employ ethnicity to resolve adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with repression, it will likely decrease their ability of police to engender cooperation from the community they are policing. As the literature on comparative policing grows, we need to keep in mind that the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence in addition to the state's ability to provide law and order are inherently political processes that depend on how individuals view the police and their actions, especially in un-consolidated democracies and autocracies.

References

- Alesina, Alberto; Reza Baqir & William Easterly (1999) Public goods and ethnic divisions. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4): 1243–1284.
- Alesina, Alberto & Eliana La Ferrara (2002) Who trusts others? *Journal of Public Economics* 85(2): 207–234.
- Amnesty International (2019) Uganda: Detention of Bobi Wine is a shameless attempt to silence dissent.
- Arriola, Leonardo R. (2013) Protesting and policing in a multiethnic authoritarian state: Evidence from Ethiopia. *Comparative Politics* 45(2): 147–168.
- Baldwin, James (1966) Report from occupied territory. *Nation* 203(2): 39–43.
- Barnett, Maria (2018) History of violence on repeat in Uganda (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/11/history-violence-repeat-uganda>).
- Blair, Robert; Sabrina Karim, Michael J Gilligan & Kyle C Beardsley (forthcoming) Policing ethnicity: Lab-in-the-field evidence on discrimination, cooperation, and ethnic balancing in the liberian national police. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.
- Blaydes, Lisa (2018) *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Carlson, Elizabeth (2015) Ethnic voting and accountability in Africa: A choice experiment in Uganda. *World Politics* 67(2): 353–385.
- Condra, Luke N. & Sera Linardi (2019) Casual contact and ethnic bias: Experimental evidence from afghanistan. *Journal of Politics* 81(3): 1028–1042.

- Curtice, Travis (forthcoming) How repression affects public perceptions of police: Evidence from a natural experiment in Uganda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211101309>.
- Curtice, Travis B & Brandon Behlendorf (2021) Street-level repression: Protest, policing, and dissent in Uganda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65(1): 166–194.
- Daily Monitor (2018) 70 senior police officers transferred (<https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/70-senior-police-officers-transferred-Kayihura/688334-3898182-twvsg0z/index.html>).
- Davenport, Christian (2020) Introducing dyorep: A database of perpetrator–victim dyads within repressive spells. *Journal of Human Rights* 19(1): 117–137.
- Denny, Elaine K & Barbara F Walter (2014) Ethnicity and civil war. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 199–212.
- Fearon, James & David Laitin (1996) Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 90(04): 715–735.
- Finnström, Sverker (2008) *Living with bad surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Garofalo, James (1977) *Public Opinion about Crime: The Attitudes of Victims and Nonvictims in Selected Cities* volume 1. US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service.
- Grasse, Donald; Melissa Pavlik, Hilary Matfess & Travis B. Curtice (2021) Opportunistic repression: Civilian targeting by the state in response to COVID-19. *International Security* 46(2): 130–165.
- Greitens, Sheena Chestnut (2016) *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

- Habyarimana, James; Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner & Jeremy M Weinstein (2007) Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709–725.
- Habyarimana, James; Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner & Jeremy M Weinstein (2009) *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective action*. New York City, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Haim, Dotan; Matthew Nanes & Michael W Davidson (forthcoming) Family matters: The double-edged sword of police-community connections. *Journal of Politics*.
- Hainmueller, Jens; Daniel J. Hopkins & Teppei Yamamoto (2014) Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. *Political Analysis* 22(1): 1–30.
- Hassan, Mai (2017) The strategic shuffle: Ethnic geography, the internal security apparatus, and elections in Kenya. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 382–395.
- Hewstone, Miles; Mark Rubin & Hazel Willis (2002) Intergroup bias. *Annual review of psychology* 53(1): 575–604.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1996) *Hobbes: Leviathan: Revised student edition*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge University Press.
- Huang, Wilson & Michael S Vaughn (1996) Support and confidence: Public attitudes toward the police. *Americans view crime and justice: A national public opinion survey*: 31–45.
- Huq, Aziz Z; Jonathan Jackson & Rick Trinkner (2016) Legitimizing practices: Revisiting the predicates of police legitimacy. *British Journal of Criminology* 57(5): 1101–1122.
- Jackson, Jonathan; Ben Bradford, Mike Hough, Andy Myhill, Paul Quinton & Tom R Tyler (2012) Why do people comply with the law? legitimacy and the influence of legal institutions. *British Journal of Criminology* 52(6): 1051–1071.

- Kasozi, Abdu (1994) *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Kazibwe, Kenneth (2019) 142 officers reshuffled in latest police transfers (<https://nilepost.co.ug/2019/01/14/142-officers-reshuffled-in-latest-police-transfers/>).
- Lipsky, Michael (1971) Street-level bureaucracy and the analysis of urban reform. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 6(4): 391–409.
- Lyall, Jason; Yuki Shiraito & Kosuke Imai (2015) Coethnic bias and wartime informing. *Journal of Politics* 77(3): 833–848.
- Magaloni, Beatriz (2008) Enforcing the Autocratic Political Order and the Role of Courts: The Case of Mexico , 180–206. Cambridge University Press.
- Magaloni, Beatriz & Luis Rodriguez (2020) Institutionalized police brutality: Torture, the militarization of security, and the reform of inquisitorial criminal justice in Mexico. *American Political Science Review* 114(4): 1013–1034.
- Manekin, Devorah & Tamar Mitts (forthcoming) Effective for whom? ethnic identity and nonviolent resistance. *American Political Science Review*.
- Mazerolle, Lorraine; Emma Antrobus, Sarah Bennett & Tom R Tyler (2013) Shaping citizen perceptions of police legitimacy: A randomized field trial of procedural justice. *Criminology* 51(1): 33–63.
- Miguel, Edward & Mary Kay Gugerty (2005) Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya. *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11): 2325–2368.
- Nanes, Matthew J (2020) Policing in divided societies: Officer inclusion, citizen cooperation, and crime prevention. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37(5): 580–604.

- Ocungi, Julius (2019) Over 1,000 applicants disqualified from police recruitment in acholi (<https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/-over-1000-applicants-disqualified-from-police-recruitment-in-acholi->).
- Quinlivan, James T (1999) Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East. *International Security* 24(2): 131–165.
- Raleigh, Clionadh; Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre & Joakim Karlsen (2010) Introducing ACLED: An armed conflict location and event dataset: Special data feature. *Journal of peace research* 47(5): 651–660.
- Roessler, Philip (2011) The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa. *World Politics* 63(02): 300–346.
- Schuman, Howard (1997) *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, Maya & Omar Wasow (2016) Race as a bundle of sticks: Designs that estimate effects of seemingly immutable characteristics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 499–522.
- Shen-Bayh, Fiona (2018) Strategies of repression: Judicial and extrajudicial methods of autocratic survival. *World Politics* 70(3): 321–357.
- Skogan, Wesley & Kathleen Frydl (2004) *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: the Evidence*. Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington DC: National Academies Press.
- Soss, Joe & Vesla Weaver (2017) Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities. *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 565–591.
- Svolik, Milan W (2009) Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 477–494.

- Tapscott, Rebecca (2021) *Arbitrary States: Social Control and Modern Authoritarianism in Museveni's Uganda*. Oxford University Press.
- The Observer (2018) IGP Ochola shuffles 96 senior police officers (<https://observer.ug/news/headlines/57462-igp-ochola-shuffles-96-senior-police-officers.html>).
- Tyler, Tom R (2003) Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law. *Crime and Justice* 30: 283–357.
- Tyler, Tom R (2004) Enhancing police legitimacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593(1): 84–99.
- Tyler, Tom R (2005) Policing in black and white: Ethnic group differences in trust and confidence in the police. *Police Quarterly* 8(3): 322–342.
- Tyler, Tom R (2006) *Why People Obey the Law*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UPF (2019) Uganda police force on a fast positive stride (<https://www.upf.go.ug/uganda-police-force-fast-positive-stride/>).
- Weber, Max (1958) Politics as a vocation. In: *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weitzer, Ronald & Badi Hasisi (2008) Does ethnic composition make a difference? citizens' assessments of Arab police officers in Israel. *Policing & Society* 18(4): 362–376.
- Young, Lauren E. (2019) The psychology of state repression: Fear and dissent decisions in Zimbabwe. *American Political Science Review* 113(1): 140–155.

Online Appendix for Co-ethnic Bias and Policing in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

(Supporting Information not meant for print publication. Online version of appendix available at the publisher’s website)

This Supplemental Appendix accompanies “Co-ethnic Bias and Policing in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime: Experimental Evidence from Uganda.” Replication files to implement the empirical models in the main article and in this Supplemental Appendix will be available at the author’s websites after publication.

In Section A below, I provide additional data on Uganda including the distribution of ethnic groups and political violence or social unrest events. In Section B, I discuss the multi-stage sampling approach used to select the study’s enumeration areas and participants. This section also provides descriptive statistics on the sample demographics. In Section C, I report tabular results for the models in the main paper. In Section D, I demonstrate that the results are robust to other specifications, including disaggregating by the officer’s surname.

Additional Uganda Data


In this section, I present the distribution of ethnic groups from the 2002 and 2014 census. Uganda is an ethnically diverse society (See Table II in the online appendix). There are at least 65 ethnic groups in Uganda. The Baganda ethnic group is Uganda’s largest ethnic group, composing approximately 16.5 % of Uganda’s population.

Table II. Ethnic Groups in Uganda

Ethnic Groups	2002		2014	
	# (Millions)	%	# (Millions)	%
Baganda	4.13	17.7	5.56	16.5
Banyankole	2.33	10.0	3.22	9.6
Basoga	2.07	8.9	2.96	8.8
Bakiga	1.68	7.2	2.39	7.1
Iteso	1.57	6.7	2.36	7.0
Langi	1.49	6.4	2.13	6.3
Bagisu	1.12	4.8	1.65	4.9
Acholi	1.14	4.9	1.47	4.4
Lugbara	1.02	4.4	1.10	3.3
Other Ethnic Groups	6.76	31.4	10.8	32.1
Total	23.29	100	33.6	100

Figure 3 shows the police are the security sector most likely to engage in the daily activities associated with repressing dissent. From January 1997 to July 2018 (See Figure 3 in the online appendix), data show that the UPDF and UPF were collectively involved in 2,377 events of political violence and social unrest, with the UPF involved in 30% of them (Raleigh et al., 2010).

Figure 3. Political Violence and Social Unrest Events, January 1997 to July 2018



Note: Each geopoint represents a political violence or social unrest event involving either Uganda Police Force (left) or Uganda People's Defense Force (right). The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project provides five categories of political violence and protest events: 1) Battles include "a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location." 2) Remote violence is defined as an event in which the tool for engaging in conflict did not require the physical presence of perpetrators. 3) Riots/protests include political events involving either protesters or rioters, depending on whether it is violent. 4) Strategic development captures events that are "important within a state's political history, and may be triggers of future events, but are not directly violent." 5) Violence against civilians are events involving deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel, militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants.

There are concerns with under-reporting within events data; however, the ACLED data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression. The UPDF conducted more political violence events than the UPF; however, nearly all (94.2%) were battle-related or remote violence events rather than events we associate with state repression. Considering those involving the UPF, a vast majority (87%) are categorized as events associated with state repression.

Conjoint Experiment

Sample selection

I selected Gulu District to hold the ethnicity of the respondent fixed as one group, so that I could vary the ethnicity of the police officer and criminal. Examining Gulu District allows me to focus the study on one ethnic group: the Acholi. The Acholi ethnic group experienced years of political and economic hardship from the civil conflict from 1986 to 2008. Traditionally, the Acholi ethnic group opposed the current administration. Understanding the dynamics in Gulu district offers important theoretical insights and policy implications that generalize to other districts in Uganda.

For the pilot, enumerator areas were selected by meeting with Gulu District's local chairperson 5 (LC5) identifying the five initial sub-counties for the study: Palaro, Laliya, Paibong, Paicho, and Unyama. We selected a balance of old and new sub-counties for the study, including rural and urban areas. Next, we randomly selected parishes within the sub-counties. Then, we randomly selected villages within each parish. Within the selected villages, enumerators went to the center of the village and selected participants through a random walk/snowball sampling design, rotating male and female participants.

After the pilot, the remaining 17 sub-counties were selected randomly. Participants within these randomly selected sub-counties were selected using the same approach as the one used during the pilot. Within Gulu District, the only sub-counties not selected randomly were those used in the pilot. As such, Gulu District was selected strategically for the design. Within Gulu District, 17 of the 22 sub-counties were selected randomly. Each of the parishes and villages were also subsequently randomly selected. Finally, enumerators worked from the center of the randomly selected village interviewing participants rotating the gender of participants recruited.

Demographics and Descriptive Statistics

In this section of the appendix, I provide demographics and descriptive statistics. The Conjoint experiment was implemented in Gulu District Uganda. Table III provides the number of observations and percentage of respondents by ethnicity, gender, age, education, and household earnings.

Table III. Conjoint Sample: Personal Demographics

	# of Observations	Percentage
Ethnicity		
Acholi	937	95.32
Alur	16	1.63
Other	30	3.05
Gender		
Female	535	54.43
Male	448	45.57
Age		
18-24 years old	178	18.11
25-34 years old	300	30.52
35-44 years old	211	21.46
45-54 years old	156	15.87
55-64 years old	86	8.75
65-74 years old	30	3.05
75 years or older	22	2.24
Education		
No formal schooling	130	13.22
Some schooling did not complete P.1	36	3.66
Some primary schooling did not complete primary	325	33.06
Completed primary did not attend secondary	182	18.51
Some secondary schooling did not complete secondary	195	19.84
Completed secondary schooling	52	5.29
Completed Post primary specialized training or Certificate	25	2.54
Completed Post secondary specialized training or Diploma	25	2.54
Completed Degree and above	13	1.32
Household Earnings		
Less than 25,000	76	7.73
25,001-100,000	209	21.26
100,001-200,000	197	20.04
200,001-300,000	171	17.40
300,001-400,000	99	10.07
400,001-500,000	47	4.78
500,001-600,000	21	2.14
600,001-700,000	13	1.32
700,001-800,000	17	1.73
800,001-900,000	14	1.42
900,001-1,000,000	13	1.32
More than 1,000,001	27	2.75
Non-response (don't read)	79	8.04

Table IV provides respondents’ demographics by party affiliation and whether they voted in the last election. In addition to party affiliation and voting patterns, enumerators also asked about other political activities including whether respondents had signed a petition against a political party/candidate; taken part in a political party demonstration, protest, or march; attended a political rally; helped organize a political party demonstration or protest; expressed views on an issue by contacting a politician; expressed views on an issue by contacting a newspaper, online blog, or online discussion board; and expressed political views on an issue by contacting a politician; and expressed political views on an issue on social media such as Twitter, WhatsApp, or Facebook.

Table IV. Conjoint Sample: Political Demographics

	# of Observations	Percentage
Party Affiliation		
National Resistance Movement	426	43.34
Democratic Party	12	1.22
Forum for Democratic Change	189	19.22
Independent	194	19.73
People’s Development Party	2	0.20
People’s Progressive Party	2	0.20
Uganda People’s Congress	18	1.83
Non-response (don’t read)	133	13.53
Voted in the Last Election		
Yes	793	80.67
No	179	18.21
Non-response (don’t read)	11	1.12

Table V provides the number of observations and percentage of respondents by experiences with various types of insecurity ranging from hearing about violence in their community to personally experiencing violence.

Table V. Conjoint Sample: Negative Interactions with Police and Exposure to Crime and Insecurity

	# of Observations	Percentage
Personally Experienced Violence or Insecurity		
Never	556	56.56
Just once or twice	297	30.21
Several times	109	11.09
Many times	21	2.14
Heard about Violence or Insecurity in your Community		
Never	196	19.94
Just once or twice	376	38.25
Several times	295	30.01
Many times	116	11.80
Fearred becoming a Victim of Political Intimidation or Violence		
Never	725	73.75
Just once or twice	176	17.90
Several times	64	6.51
Many times	12	1.22
Don't know	2	0.20
Non-response (don't read)	4	0.41
Had a Negative Interaction with the Police		
Never	777	79.04
Just once or twice	174	17.70
Several times	29	2.95
Many times	3	0.31
Fear Crime in your Current Neighborhood		
Never	340	34.59
Just once or twice	395	40.18
Several times	199	20.24
Many times	49	4.98
Stayed Home because of the Threat of Violence Outside		
Never	536	54.53
Just once or twice	291	29.60
Several times	132	13.43
Many times	23	2.34
Don't know	1	0.10
Felt Unsafe in Your Neighborhood		
Never	419	42.62
Just once or twice	366	37.23
Several times	166	16.89
Many times	30	3.05
Don't know	1	0.10
Non-response (don't read)	1	0.10

Main Results


Table VI shows the tabular results of the main analyses in the paper. Model 1 is used for the visualization Figure 1.

Next, Models 2 - 4 provide the tabular results for the top coefficient plot results visualized Figure 2. In this model, the baseline category is some level of trust in the relevant political authority. Here, the theoretical expectation is that the interactions between mistrust in the respective institutions and co-ethnic officers should be positive and statistically significant.

Finally, Table VII presents that tabular results used for bottom models visualized in Figure 2, showing the respondent's disaggregated levels of trust in the president (Model 5), the police (Model 6) and the courts (Model 7). In this table, the baseline category is no trust in the respective institution. Here, the interaction terms should be negative, as increased trust should decrease co-ethnic bias in expectation.²⁵

Figure 4 shows the conditional effect of trust in neighbors or strangers on co-ethnic bias. Regarding levels of trust in their neighbors, the differences across levels of trust are not statistically distinguishable. However, individuals who expressed no trust showed the lowest levels of co-ethnic bias. Alternatively, the difference between those who have trust and no trust in strangers is statistically significant, demonstrating that people who do not trust strangers are significantly more likely to prefer officers who share their ethnicity.

Figure 4. Conditional Effects of Trust in Neighbors and Strangers on Co-ethnic Bias



Note: This plot shows the conditional effects of trust on co-ethnic bias. AMCEs are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic. Only AMCEs for co-ethnic officer coefficients are shown by respondents' level of trust in neighbors (hollow circle) and strangers (hollow triangle).

²⁵Tabular results with interactions are provided to show whether interaction terms are statistically significant. Following work by Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto (2014), the coefficient plots are based on estimating the baseline equation after subsetting the data based on respondents' level of trust in the police, the president, and the courts.

Table VI. Main Results and Conditioning Effects of Mistrust on Co-ethnic Bias (Full Results)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Co-ethnic Officers	0.1093*** (0.0128)	0.0945*** (0.0145)	0.0938*** (0.0142)	0.0817*** (0.0142)
Senior	0.0344* (0.0135)	0.0377* (0.0154)	0.0388* (0.0151)	0.0396* (0.0162)
35 years old	0.0467*** (0.0128)	0.0430** (0.0147)	0.0374* (0.0145)	0.0348* (0.0152)
47 years old	0.0422** (0.0134)	0.0366* (0.0154)	0.0444** (0.0152)	0.0364* (0.0159)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0081 (0.0181)	-0.0094 (0.0207)	-0.0025 (0.0207)	0.0298 (0.0214)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0198 (0.0185)	0.0135 (0.0213)	0.0313 (0.0210)	0.0511* (0.0216)
Very often pays for information	-0.0197 (0.0194)	-0.0191 (0.0222)	-0.0161 (0.0221)	-0.0038 (0.0230)
Always pays for information	0.0315 (0.0190)	0.0389 (0.0221)	0.0461* (0.0215)	0.0628** (0.0226)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0005 (0.0120)	0.0066 (0.0139)	-0.0044 (0.0136)	-0.0104 (0.0142)
Mistrust President		-0.0082 (0.0395)		
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust President		0.0709* (0.0312)		
Mistrust President×Senior		-0.0315 (0.0321)		
Mistrust President×35 years old		0.0066 (0.0295)		
Mistrust President×47 years old		0.0132 (0.0306)		
Mistrust President×Rarely pays for information		0.0049 (0.0421)		
Mistrust President×Sometimes pays for information		0.0299 (0.0442)		
Mistrust President×Very often pays for information		-0.0073 (0.0471)		
Mistrust President×Always pays for information		-0.0392 (0.0440)		
Mistrust President×Co-ethnic criminal		-0.0313 (0.0276)		
Mistrust Police			-0.0347 (0.0439)	
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust Police			0.0756* (0.0320)	
Mistrust Police×Senior			-0.0172 (0.0340)	
Mistrust Police×35 years old			0.0468 (0.0316)	
Mistrust Police×47 years old			-0.0109 (0.0325)	
Mistrust Police×Rarely pays for information			-0.0347 (0.0423)	
Mistrust Police×Sometimes pays for information			-0.0580 (0.0455)	
Mistrust Police×Very often pays for information			-0.0206 (0.0469)	
Mistrust Police×Always pays for information			-0.0713 (0.0473)	
Mistrust Police×Co-ethnic criminal			0.0293 (0.0291)	
Mistrust Courts				-0.0094 (0.0424)
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust Courts				0.0838* (0.0336)
Mistrust Courts×Senior				-0.0213 (0.0314)
Mistrust Courts×35 years old				0.0549 (0.0311)
Mistrust Courts×47 years old				0.0358 (0.0322)
Mistrust Courts×Rarely pays for information				-0.1423** (0.0440)
Mistrust Courts×Sometimes pays for information				-0.1284** (0.0460)
Mistrust Courts×Very often pays for information				-0.0625 (0.0472)
Mistrust Courts×Always pays for information				-0.0926* (0.0456)
Mistrust Courts×Co-ethnic criminal				0.0340 (0.0289)
(Intercept)	0.3535*** (0.0176)	0.3592*** (0.0205)	0.3603*** (0.0197)	0.3598*** (0.0208)
Num. obs.	9370	9270	9310	8820

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table VII. Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Disaggregated Levels of Trust

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Co-ethnic Officers	0.1654*** (0.0277)	0.1695*** (0.0287)	0.1655*** (0.0305)
A little trust in president	0.0575 (0.0482)		
A bit of trust in president	0.0140 (0.0509)		
A lot of trust in president	-0.0251 (0.0469)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in president	-0.0619 (0.0425)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in president	-0.0464 (0.0351)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in president	-0.0961** (0.0358)		
A little trust in police		-0.0101 (0.0535)	
A bit of trust in police		0.0708 (0.0485)	
A lot of trust in police		0.0154 (0.0563)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in police		-0.0590 (0.0383)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in police		-0.0871* (0.0358)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in police		-0.0688 (0.0410)	
A little trust in courts			-0.0222 (0.0534)
A bit of trust in courts			0.0422 (0.0476)
A lot of trust in courts			-0.0196 (0.0576)
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in courts			-0.0451 (0.0406)
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in courts			-0.1093** (0.0368)
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in courts			-0.0790 (0.0417)
Num. obs.	9270	9310	8820

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. Only constituent terms and their interaction with trust are shown. The other officer attributes, ethnicity of criminal, and component terms suppressed. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Robustness Checks and Additional Models

In the empirical analyses in the paper, the main independent variable of interest is co-ethnic officers, coded as 1 if the officer shared ethnicity with participants and 0 otherwise. An alternative approach is to use Equation 2 which estimates the surnames independently.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Police Officer}_{ijk} = & \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{Odong}_{ijt}] + \theta_2[\text{Adong}_{ijk}] + \theta_3[\text{Nakato}_{ijk}] + \theta_4[\text{Senior}_{ijk}] \\ & + \theta_5[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 35] + \theta_6[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 47] + \theta_7[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Rarely}] \\ & + \theta_8[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Sometimes}] + \theta_9[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Very Often}] \\ & + \theta_{10}[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Always}] + \theta_{11}[\text{Robber}_{ijk} = \text{Pader}] + \epsilon_{ijk} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

I replicate the main results in the paper employing Equation 2, presented in Table VIII. These results demonstrate that co-ethnic bias, even allowing for gender preferences, still largely determines people's preference for reporting crime to specific officers.

Next, Table IX shows the conditional effects of mistrust in the president (Model 9), the police (model 10), and the courts (model 11) by each officer's surnames rather than by the binary variable for co-ethnic officers.

Table X provides that tabular results by gender, age, and education level of respondents. Models 12 and 13 provide the results of the baseline model based on the gender of the respondent. Models 14 - 16 provide results by the respondent's age. Finally, Models 17-20 in Table X assess comparisons across education levels.

Co-ethnic bias has a consistent effect on officer selection across gender and age. As discussed in the paper, ethnicity appears to have a stronger effect among individuals with lower education levels. This provides some additional support for previous findings in the literature (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002) that people with less access to education have lower levels of trust in the government.

Table VIII. Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent

	Model 8
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1180*** (0.0165)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1043*** (0.0168)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0037 (0.0156)
Senior Officer	0.0345* (0.0135)
35 years old	0.0483*** (0.0131)
47 years old	0.0419** (0.0135)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0079 (0.0180)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0206 (0.0185)
Very often pays for information	-0.0193 (0.0194)
Always pays for information	0.0315 (0.0193)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0004 (0.0120)
(Intercept)	0.3510*** (0.0195)
Num. obs.	9370

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table IX. Conditional Effects of Mistrust by Officer's Surnames

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1109*** (0.0188)	0.0987*** (0.0181)	0.0918*** (0.0187)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0806*** (0.0190)	0.0928*** (0.0193)	0.0728*** (0.0193)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0019 (0.0183)	0.0039 (0.0180)	0.0006 (0.0184)
Co-ethnic criminal	0.0070 (0.0138)	-0.0045 (0.0136)	-0.0101 (0.0142)
Mistrust President	-0.0085 (0.0428)		
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust President	0.0318 (0.0405)		
Mistrust President×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1157** (0.0400)		
Mistrust President×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0058 (0.0338)		
Mistrust Police		-0.0360 (0.0478)	
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust Police		0.0944* (0.0434)	
Mistrust Police×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)		0.0550 (0.0395)	
Mistrust Police×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)		-0.0012 (0.0355)	
Mistrust Courts			-0.0083 (0.0467)
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust Courts			0.0663 (0.0421)
Mistrust Courts×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)			0.1017* (0.0411)
Mistrust Courts×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)			0.0011 (0.0391)
Num. obs.	9270	9310	8820

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table X. Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondents' Gender, Age, and Education

	Gender		Age Group				Education Level		
	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1157*** (0.0249)	0.1213*** (0.0218)	0.1316*** (0.0243)	0.0965*** (0.0270)	0.1324** (0.0413)	0.1373** (0.0466)	0.1337*** (0.0215)	0.0757* (0.0339)	0.1041 (0.0767)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0727** (0.0241)	0.1319*** (0.0230)	0.1042*** (0.0249)	0.0883*** (0.0258)	0.1505** (0.0450)	0.1510*** (0.0441)	0.1152*** (0.0230)	0.0618 (0.0341)	0.0753 (0.0617)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	-0.0151 (0.0219)	0.0205 (0.0219)	0.0138 (0.0219)	-0.0298 (0.0250)	0.0594 (0.0451)	0.0600 (0.0488)	0.0179 (0.0209)	-0.0279 (0.0282)	-0.1216 (0.0659)
Senior	0.0088 (0.0197)	0.0568** (0.0183)	0.0528** (0.0186)	0.0282 (0.0224)	-0.0121 (0.0389)	-0.0174 (0.0398)	0.0583** (0.0180)	0.0246 (0.0269)	-0.0172 (0.0495)
35 years old	0.0615** (0.0191)	0.0377* (0.0180)	0.0537** (0.0199)	0.0441* (0.0208)	0.0439 (0.0318)	0.0414 (0.0338)	0.0543** (0.0180)	0.0313 (0.0268)	0.0618 (0.0473)
47 years old	0.0307 (0.0206)	0.0525** (0.0177)	0.0343 (0.0194)	0.0473* (0.0220)	0.0499 (0.0364)	0.0626 (0.0360)	0.0626*** (0.0185)	-0.0038 (0.0257)	0.0014 (0.0523)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0371 (0.0264)	0.0163 (0.0247)	-0.0172 (0.0257)	-0.0079 (0.0305)	0.0274 (0.0454)	-0.0317 (0.0476)	-0.0074 (0.0254)	-0.0010 (0.0349)	-0.0070 (0.0655)
Sometimes pays for information	-0.0041 (0.0279)	0.0425 (0.0248)	0.0157 (0.0272)	0.0307 (0.0307)	0.0193 (0.0454)	-0.0065 (0.0449)	0.0291 (0.0255)	0.0316 (0.0378)	-0.0363 (0.0746)
Very often pays for information	-0.0395 (0.0287)	0.0000 (0.0263)	-0.0402 (0.0281)	0.0132 (0.0322)	-0.0319 (0.0483)	-0.0474 (0.0513)	-0.0086 (0.0265)	-0.0196 (0.0402)	-0.0240 (0.0636)
Always pays for information	-0.0080 (0.0289)	0.0676** (0.0257)	0.0172 (0.0266)	0.0583 (0.0341)	0.0171 (0.0482)	0.0038 (0.0490)	0.0361 (0.0263)	0.0544 (0.0397)	-0.0341 (0.0742)
Co-ethnic criminal	0.0186 (0.0177)	-0.0179 (0.0161)	-0.0044 (0.0170)	-0.0047 (0.0206)	0.0232 (0.0295)	0.0156 (0.0327)	0.0048 (0.0169)	-0.0109 (0.0230)	-0.0449 (0.0388)
(Intercept)	0.3901*** (0.0272)	0.3160*** (0.0271)	0.3403*** (0.0278)	0.3719*** (0.0321)	0.3291*** (0.0533)	0.3274*** (0.0581)	0.3210*** (0.0264)	0.3984*** (0.0358)	0.4924*** (0.0651)
Subset	Male	Female	Age	Age	Age	No	Some - completed	Some - completed	Diploma
Criteria	Respondents	Respondents	18-34	35-54	≥ 55	schooling	primary	secondary	or Degree
Num. obs.	4350	5020	4540	3460	1370	1250	5090	2400	630

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Next, I consider an alternative mechanism that might be driving co-ethnic cooperation. In the provision of other collective goods people prefer individuals with common ethnicity either because they have a shared affinity (preference-in-common) or because they believe co-ethnics are just more effective. The main logic of the technology mechanism is that people should prefer co-ethnics because they believe they will be most effective.

The conjoint experiment design in the paper is designed to test divergent expectations under these mechanisms, depending on the ethnicity of the perpetrator. If attitudes toward officers are shaped by both the ethnicity of the officer and the perpetrator (i.e., technology or affinity mechanisms), these theories would predict diverging expectations depending on whether ethnicity operates through the affinity or technology mechanism.

From the perspective of the respondent, when the robber is a co-ethnic (from Pader), a co-ethnic officer should be more helpful and more effective. Here, both potential mechanisms would predict co-ethnic bias, making people more likely to prefer an officer who shares their ethnicity. However, when the robber is a non-co-ethnic (from Mukono where the majority of citizens are Baganda), the technology mechanism would predict that people would prefer an officer who shares the identity of the criminal because they would be more effective at investigating. Alternatively, the affinity mechanism would still predict that people should prefer officers who share their ethnicity, regardless of the identity of the criminal. Considering this possibility, Table XI replicates the baseline OLS model but subsetting the sample on whether the robber is from Pader (Acholi) (Model 21) or from Mukono (Mugandan) (Model 22).

The effect of co-ethnic bias appears to be driven by affinity/shared preferences, relative to the technology mechanism. Even if respondents believe a Baganda officer would be more effective at investigating a robber who is Mugandan, these results show respondents still prefer co-ethnic officers. When the robber is Acholi, Acholi respondents selected male and female co-ethnic officers 10.14 percentage points (SE = 2.35) and 10.42 percentage points (SE = 2.19) relative to the out-group officer sharing identity with the robber. However, when the robber is Mugandan (from the Baganda ethnic group), Acholi respondents still preferred Acholi officers to Baganda officers: 13.21 percentage points (SE = 2.25) more for male Acholi officers and 11.16 percentage points (SE = 2.54) for female Acholi officers. Assessing respondents' preferences for selecting officers shows respondents in Gulu prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers, especially male officers relative to non-co-ethnic males. Results suggest co-ethnic cooperation in the provision of law and order – reporting crimes – operates through a co-ethnic bias – a systematic tendency to prefer their own group to members of another. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the co-ethnic bias is quite large given that I was indirectly signalling ethnicity by only using traditional surnames. Across each model, the ethnicity of the officer consistently has a larger effect on the probability that the officer is selected relative to the other possible explanations, including officer's age, rank, and whether they pay for information.

Table XI. Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Ethnicity of the Criminal

	Model 21	Model 22
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1014*** (0.0235)	0.1321*** (0.0225)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1042*** (0.0219)	0.1116*** (0.0254)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0080 (0.0201)	0.0086 (0.0232)
Senior	-0.0074 (0.0174)	0.0799*** (0.0179)
35 years old	0.0723*** (0.0192)	0.0264 (0.0210)
47 years old	0.0551** (0.0189)	0.0327 (0.0218)
Rarely pays for information	0.0172 (0.0275)	-0.0338 (0.0240)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0257 (0.0257)	0.0141 (0.0251)
Very often pays for information	-0.0100 (0.0252)	-0.0277 (0.0262)
Always pays for information	0.0591* (0.0258)	0.0101 (0.0273)
(Intercept)	0.3495*** (0.0260)	0.3447*** (0.0275)
Subset	Co-ethnic	Non-co-ethnic
Criteria	Criminal	Criminal
Num. obs.	4897	4473

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$