Street-Level Repression: Protest, Policing, and the Generation of Dissent in Uganda

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Abstract

In many countries, the police are both the guardians of public safety and the primary instruments of state repression. Used to quell dissent, many argue their excessive force can drive further collective action, leading to a repression-dissent nexus. Yet does police repression spur dissent for all, or only for those already dissenting? We argue excessive police violence causes political backlash, decreasing support for police and increasing political dissent. Further, we argue these effects are conditioned by individuals' previous collective action, supersede positive support for the police, and are independent of party support. Using a nationally representative survey experiment of 1,920 Ugandans in 194 parishes, we find robust evidence for political backlash effects of repression across all demographics, regardless of previous collective action. By examining the politics of policing in an autocracy, we show excessive state-violence triggers political backlash, increasing expressions of political dissent and decreasing support for the security apparatus.

Keywords: authoritarianism, policing, collective action, repression, survey experiment, Uganda

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1 Introduction

What is the effect of repression on dissent? Are these effects uniform or conditional on individuals' characteristics, including whether they participated in collective action? Most studies of repression begin with the assertion that increases in dissent are associated with increases in state repression. Governments repress to deter political dissent.[1] The idea that governments use repression to deter collective action is so well-established that it is often referred to as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness" or "Threat-Response Theory" (Davenport 2007, Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). As Moore (1998, 851) notes, "repression sparks dissident behavior, yet repression also deters dissident behavior."

Previous work on state repression and collective action overlooks the dual functions that police have in autocracies. On one hand, police are agents autocrats use to repress political dissent. On the other, police are agents tasked with providing law and order as a public good, even for those who engage in political protest.[2] Police presence at protests, even without further escalation, can be an expression of state coercion (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). Yet police are responsible for providing protection for those engaging in dissent and securing public spaces, private property, and physical integrity rights. Examining the effects of repression on dissent requires us to isolate repressive action from actions police take to provide law and order and ensuring security for civilians at political rallies.

We argue repressive action by police triggers political backlash, decreasing support for police and increasing expressions of political dissent, including public criticism of the state security apparatus and future protests. We expect attitudes and responses of civilians to police action to be conditional on whether they observe police providing law and order and securing political space as a public good or using excessive force to restrict it. Consequently,

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[1] A robust literature supports the notion that authorities repress to suppress dissent, see for example, Carey (2006), Davenport (1995, 2007), Henderson (1991), Lichbach (1987), Moore (2000), and Nordås and Davenport (2013).

[2] As Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003, 586) note: "police at a protest event have a wide array of policing options, ranging from continued presence with no further action to the deployment of escalated force." For example, see McCarthy and McPhail (1998), McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy (1998).

depending on how police officers use coercion – whether to ensure law and order or repress collective action – conditions how individuals respond to use of force by police. We test these assumptions with a survey experiment on collective action and policing in Uganda.[3]

Individuals are unlikely to protest if they expect the government to repress (Ritter and Conrad 2016). They are also unlikely to protest if the protests are not safe. Protesters support police actions taken to secure the public spaces, even as they oppose police repression under autocratic rule. Accordingly, we examine civilians' attitudes toward the security apparatus and the extent to which appropriate police action *(providing law and order as public good)* or excessive police force *(repressing political dissent)* affects individuals' support for the police, willingness to publicly criticize police, or engage in direct collective action.

Although individuals are willing to engage in mass protests to challenge the status quo, they have a coordination problem: they do not know whether they have the sufficient threshold to effectively mobilize and impose change from below (De Mesquita 2010, Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1993, Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011). Individuals willing to challenge the status quo falsify their preferences until they know there is sufficient support – a high enough probability of success – to make the risk worthwhile (Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1994). Consequently, would-be-protesters must pay an initial cost to reveal their true preferences. Once these costs are paid and preferences are revealed, protesters should be more willing to express political dissent. Thus, perceptions of police will be shaped by whether individuals *actively participate* in collective dissent or are merely *observers*.

Examining the effect of repression on dissent is challenging for three reasons. First, behaviors are endogenous, as governments and political activists act in expectation of each other's behavior (Ritter and Conrad 2016). Second, observational event data are limited in their ability to separate events where police use appropriate force from those where they use excessive force, making the counterfactual unclear. Third, variation in police action is not random and likely to suffer from selection bias making causal identification with these data

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[3]We sought to address several ethical concerns by working closely with a highly reputable research firm. The survey experiment was included in a panel survey round focused on safety, policing, and security.

difficult.

To overcome these challenges, we embed an experiment in a nationally representative survey of 1,920 respondents in 100 districts and 194 parishes in Uganda, an electoral autocracy. We randomly assign respondents to one of four treatment conditions where they were presented with one of the following hypothetical situations: 1) they *observe* a rally where police use force to maintain law and order; 2) they *participate* in a similar rally; 3) they *observe* a rally where police use excessive force; and 4) they *participate* in a rally where police use excessive force. We then measure whether respondents would support, publicly criticize, and/or protest actions taken by police.

Our survey experiment was conducted in Uganda from June 28 to July 20 2018, providing a unique perspective on policing in Uganda in the days leading up to the repressive crackdown of opposition political leaders by the 32 year-old dictatorship led by Yoweri Museveni. We completed data collection less than a month before the arrest and torture of Robert Kyangulany Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, and other opposition politicians during the Arua Municipal by-elections. Suppressive actions taken by the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and other security sector forces underscore tensions between safety and repression that civilians face toward police in autocracies, as well as other forms of governance.

To preview our results, we find robust evidence of backlash effects. Respondents who received the repressive treatment conditions where police used excessive violence at a rally expressed less support for police and an increased willingness to publicly criticize and even protest actions taken by police. Moreover, viewing repression while engaged in the rally led to an increased willingness to publicly criticize police and engage in future protests. We further examine the moderating effects of various demographic factors and support for the ruling party.

2 Politics of Repressing and Policing

An extensive literature examines the dynamics between repression and protest (Carey 2006, Gurr 1986, Lichbach 1995, 1987, Moore 1998, Opp 1994, Rasler 1996, Tilly 1978, Zimmerman 1980). As a mechanism of control to raise the cost of collective action (Tilly 1978), the strategical goal of repression is to reduce the capacity and/or will to challenge the status quo (Galtung 1969, Nordås and Davenport 2013). Governments use their state security apparatus to impose costs on those engaged in collective action, including psychological intimidation (stigmatization or increased fear entering public spaces), material losses (loss of economic revenue and destruction of property), or even physical rights violations (arrest, torture, disappearance, or death). Additionally, these costs are not mutually exclusive.

The overwhelming consensus is that governments repress to deter political dissent. The theoretical claim is so consistently expressed and real-life examples of governments using repression as a mechanism to deter civilian dissent so ubiquitous, human rights scholars have referred to this relationship as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). Yet, we lack micro-level data on individuals to determine whether repressing dissent is a rational action for governments.

When governments use preventive repression, their best response to dissent that does occur is unclear. For example, Ritter and Conrad (2016) find that observed dissent does not meaningfully predict responsive repression and protestors are likely to strategically self-censor out of dissent in expectation of a repressive response by the state. Using an instrumental variable approach, Ritter and Conrad (2016) employ rainfall as an instrument for dissent to show that preventive aspects of repression meaningfully affect the relationship between observed dissent and repression. Most theoretical and empirical studies posit a positive linear relationship between collective action and repression. Yet as their study demonstrates, the relationship between repression and dissent is endogenous: "governments and dissidents act in expectation of each other's behavior" (Ritter and Conrad 2016, 85). So the general consensus of the protest-repression literature is that "repression sparks dissident behavior,

yet repression also deters dissident behavior (Moore 1998, 851)."

An additional assumption within the human rights literature on repression and protests is that states function as a unitary actor to protect the status quo (Carey 2006, DeMeritt 2012, Fariss 2014, Henderson 1991, Murdie and Davis 2012, Poe and Tate 1994, Ritter and Conrad 2016). Theoretically, this means that the logic of repression develops from the interests and preferences of the executive. Empirically, most quantitative studies offer cross-national analysis with the primary unit of analysis at the country level, i.e., country-year or country-month. This assumption masks the dynamics of repression biasing our understanding of important sub-state variation in the behavior of and response to the political actors responsible for most repression – police.

Even in authoritarian states, police have multiple responsibilities. On one hand, police are agents providing law and order as one of the most important and basic public goods states provide (Weber, 1918, Hume 1769, Hobbes 1651). On the other hand, police function as agents of repression ensuring the survival of the authoritarian regime and maintaining the political status quo (Curtice 2018). Studies have examined the principal-agent problems associated with repression, including: the relationship between executives and individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating (torturing) state prisoners (Conrad and Moore 2010); why executives delegate human rights abuses to militias (Cohen and Nordås 2015, Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014); and the moral hazard of authoritarian repression and military intervention (Svolik 2013). Despite a robust literature on state repression and dissent, we do not know whether individuals respond differently to police officers who use their coercive capacity in a measured way to provide law and order and safety for civilians compared to those who use excessive violence against protesters.

While many studies highlight the role of the police as instruments of repression, most ignore the interactive relationship between protesters and the police. We argue this is problematic for two reasons: first, civilians' attitudes and perceptions toward police likely condition their willingness to protest (Tyler et al. 2018). Protesting involves several possible

threats to would-be protesters – repression from the state, violence from counter-protesters, destruction of property, and violation of personal integrity rights by fellow protesters. Beliefs about the police's ability to secure public spaces and expectations about the likelihood of repression likely conditions whether people are willing to protest. Second, police officers are responsible for both maintaining order and repressing threats to the political status quo. This contributes to potentially opposing views of police during protests: individuals simultaneously resent repression and demand safety from the same institution.

Two perspectives within the literature address the principal-agent problem that autocrats have in designing the policing apparatus. First, from a policing perspective, law and order, and security more broadly, is considered a public good provided by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1971). Within American Politics, scholars have examined the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with policing because policing requires high levels of discretion (Wilson 1968); results in informational asymmetries between officers (agents) and policing principals (Goldstein 1960, Wilson 1968); and monitoring and oversight are costly and not always effective (Goldstein 1960, Wilson 1968). Much of this literature explores problems principals face when they are concerned about selecting the wrong officers or ensuring selected officers remain honest.

Second, from a human rights perspective, studies examine how governments structure their security apparatus to ensure repressive compliance (Hassan 2017); deter threats from coups (Svolik 2012); and evade responsibility for human rights abuses (Cohen and Nordås 2015, Curtice 2018, DeMeritt 2012, Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014). For example, in autocracies, coercive institutions are "a dictator's final defense in pursuit of political survival, but also (the government's) chief obstacle to achieving that goal" (Greitens 2016). Yet many of these studies focus on the dynamics between the government and the military, overlooking the role of the police.

Importantly, the literature assumes that police officers are either street-level bureaucrats or simply cogs in the broader repressive capacity of the state's security apparatus. This is

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problematic as it either assumes away the politics of policing or overlooks the front-line role of police as repressive agents in many countries. In the first case, the prominent assumption is that if principals solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with policing, governments will effectively provide law and order. However, this does not consider that leaders might be motivated by political survival rather than by protecting the physical integrity rights and property rights of civilians. In the second case, for many governments the police are primary instruments of repression (Curtice 2018).

Regardless of political system, the high levels of discretion, costs of monitoring, and the power asymmetries between the police and civilians engenders principal-agent problems among the police. For leaders who prefer to maintain power, their political survival is conditional on their ability to solve these problems (Gandhi 2008). Coercive institutions are "a dictator's final defense in pursuit of political survival, but also his chief obstacle to achieving that goal" (Greitens 2016, 4). For civilians, attitudes toward the police condition their responses to police actions. Particularly, individuals who believe the police provide law and order as a public good will support actions taken by the police, even if it requires the use of coercion (French and Raven 1959, Hinsch 2008, Tankebe 2009, Tyler 1990). Alternatively, we should expect individuals to oppose police action if they suspect that the police use coercion to protect the interests of the autocrat, uphold the status quo and ensure the regime's political survival (Beetham 1991, Jackson and Bradford 2009).

Political dissent involves a range of attitudes and actions. First, political dissent might involve a decrease in the expressed level of support for the political status quo. Second, political dissent might involve individuals who are willing to make their opinions or frustrations about the status quo known by publicly criticizing actions taken by the state. Third, political dissent might involve collective action such as a protest or riot to challenge the state. In all of these cases, though, state repression reduces the willingness for individuals to express dissent publicly, especially if a collective action is already underway.

Countering the established consensus that repression deters dissent, we argue that ex-

cessive force by security forces while policing political dissent should trigger expressions of political dissent. We expect repression causes political backlash across the complete spectrum of political dissent. In particular, we argue that once we control for appropriate police actions, excessive police force will decrease support for the police and increase public criticisms and future protests. The counterfactual to our claim is not repressive action by police compared to no police action, as protesters might select out of situations where security is not provided. Rather we want to compare the state's use of excessive violence at a political event with more conventional norms of "appropriate" force.

Civilians must pay an initial start-up cost to protest. These costs are associated with revealing their preferences and willingness to challenge the status quo. Yet those who protest face a critical problem. Would-be-protesters might protest only if they know they have a sufficient threshold to effectively mobilize and impose change from below (De Mesquita 2010, Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1993, Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011). We expect that once civilians incur this cost, they will be more willing to express political dissent and challenge the state. Given the role of preference falsification in authoritarian politics (Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1993, 1994), we anticipate the need to examine the role of by-stander bias in measuring individuals' true preferences. Civilians who identify as participating in a protest or political event will be more likely to express political preferences associated with dissent.

Subsequent expressions of political dissent are likely influenced by previous expressions of political dissent and repressive action. Considering wartime violence, Balcells (2010) emphasized the role of rivalry and revenge in shaping violence against civilians.[4] Similarly, we should expect that individuals who are participating in political activities that experience repressive action by police will vary from those who participate at a rally without repressive action. We expect the magnitude of the backlash effects to be stronger when individuals participate at a rally where police use excessive force.

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[4]Understanding determinants of violence requires a theory combining effects of political cleavages and wartime dynamics. For example, Balcells (2010) shows a clear endogenous trend whereby subsequent levels of violence are highly correlated with initial levels of violence.

We test three sets of hypotheses to assess the effects of repressive force by police and participation in collective action on patterns of political dissent:

H1a: Assignment to participation in a political event decreases support for police.

H1b: Assignment to participation in a political event increases public criticism.

H1c: Assignment to participation in a political event increases protests.

H2a: Assignment to excessive police force at a political event decreases support for police.

H2b: Assignment to excessive police force at a political event increases public criticism.

H2c: Assignment to excessive police force at a political event increases protests.

H3a: Assignment to participation and excessive police force at a political event decreases support for police.

H3b: Assignment to participation and police force at a political event increases public criticism.

H3c: Assignment to participation and police force at a political event increases protests.

Finally, we argue that "backlash" and "bystander" effects vary by individuals' preferences and characteristics. Responses from individuals who political align with the autocrat, for example, should differ from those who are opposed to the regime. We expect heterogeneous effects associated with partisanship or support for the autocracy to condition the magnitude of the effects not the direction. Similarly, we consider the role of additional potential pre-treatment moderators, including: respondent's age and gender and whether they live in an urban or rural setting.

3 Empirical Approach

We test the widely held assumption that repression deters dissent by embedding a survey experiment in an autocracy. In particular, we examine whether individuals' self-sensor political dissent conditional on 1) whether they participated in a protest or were "bystanders;" and 2) whether the police use excessive force or appropriate police action. We test these assumptions in an autocracy (Uganda) where the police have regularly been used as agents of repression over the past 30 years.

3.1 Case Selection: Policing Dissent in Uganda

We conduct this experiment in Uganda for three main reasons. First, Uganda is an autocracy where Yoweri Museveni has maintained control since 1986.[5] Although Museveni won the last three elections with an average vote-share of 60.27%, elections in Uganda were generally panned by international and domestic observers as lacking electoral credibility. Human rights are severely restricted and in many cases violated. Political freedoms including electoral democracy, access to information and justice, and human rights protections remain curtailed or openly violated by the regime. This repression is evident in figure 1, where the average Variety of Democracy's electoral democracy index for Uganda from 1970 to 2017 is less than 0.4 (i.e. more autocratic than democratic).[6]

Second, high restrictions on free and open political spaces remain as the government limits political competition and represses dissent.[7] Museveni has maintained power with his ruling coalition by using cooptation and coercion, including gerrymandering districts to provide political goods to party loyalists and using the internal security apparatus to repress

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[5]Multiparty elections were first held in 2006 after 92% of voters approved the introduction of a multiparty system by referendum in July 2005. Only 42% of the electorate voted in the 2005 referendum but those who did vote wanted a marked departure from the 2000 referendum where 90.7% voters wanted a "Movement" not a "Multiparty" political system.

[6]The electoral index ranges from low to high with 0 being electoral democracy is not achieved and 1 fully achieved (Coppedge et al. 2018).

[7]Restrictions on opposition parties have plagued each of Uganda's subsequent elections, including arrests and beatings of opposition leaders like Kizza Besigye and Robert Kyangulany Ssentamu.

Figure 1: Uganda's Electoral Democracy Score (1970-2017)

internal and external threats to his political survival.

Third, the Uganda Police Force (UPF), led by the Inspector General of Police (IGP), fall under the direct control of the president. While the Internal Security Organization (ISO), led by the Security Minister, also contributes to domestic security, the UPF are the primary police institutions and controlled by the President.[8] We focus on the role of UPF, rather than other repressive agents, because they are the security sector most likely to engage in the daily activity we associate with repressing dissent.

The UPF are commonly used to repress political dissent associated with opposition protest. In September 2009, for example, security forces used live fire to deter protests in Kayunga. Hospitals in the area reported treating more than 88 victims following the violence, the vast majority for gunshot wounds. The official government statement was that 27 people died resulting from security forces' "stray bullets" (Barnett 2018), although some

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[8]The Ugandan security sector also includes the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the External Security Organization (ESO).

estimate more than 40 died. Rather than investigating the excessive use of force, police targeted protesters, arresting almost 850 suspected of participating in the unrest (Barnett 2018). Similarly, Museveni has increasingly relied on police to repress political dissent associated with the social media tax protests in July 2018 and the by-election rallies in August 2018. After violence broke-out during the by-elections in Arua Municipality, 5 people were killed by security forces, 33 people were charged with treason and an additional 150 people were held on remand (Monitor 2018).

The UPF's involvement in state repression is long standing. From January 1997 to July 2018, data show that the UPDF and UPF were collectively involved in 2,377 events of political violence and social unrest, with the UPF involved in 30% of them (Raleigh et al. 2010). Although there are concerns with under-reporting within events data, the ACLED data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression (see Table 1). While the UPDF conducted more political violence events than the UPF, nearly all (94.2%) were not common policing operations, such as battle-related or remote violence events. When we consider those involving the UPF, a vast majority (87%) are categorized as state repression, including political violence relating to riots, protests, strategic developments, and violence against civilians.

Table 1: Political Violence and Social Unrest Events, January 1997 to July 2018

Conflict Event	Military Forces (UPDF)		Police Forces (UPF)	
	#	%	#	%
Battle	1,536	92.4	90	13.0
Remote violence	30	1.8	0	0
Riots/Protests	4	0.24	422	59.1
Strategic development	21	1.3	73	10.2
Violence against civilians	72	4.3	129	18.1
Total Events	1,663	100	714	100

3.2 Survey

We rely on a survey experimental approach to mitigate many challenges associated with studying dissent and repression. Survey experiments allow us to overcome several methodological challenges of studying repression and collective action, including problems associated with selection biases and endogeneity. The mechanics of our experiment are straightforward. We randomly assigned our respondents to one of four groups: a control group and three treatment groups. Table 2 shows the prompt associated with each treatment. Treatments were completely randomized at the respondent level with each participant having an equal probability of receiving any individual treatment.

Table 2: Treatments (English Version)

Treatment	Text
1. Control	*Hypothetically, imagine that you **observed but did not participate** in a rally where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the **police arrested him**.*
2. Participate Treatment	*Hypothetically, imagine that you **participated in a rally** where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the **police arrested him**.*
3. Repression Treatment	*Hypothetically, imagine that you **observed but did not participate in a rally** where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the **police arrested him and others using excess force**.*
4. Both Treatments	*Hypothetically, imagine that you **participated in a rally** where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the **police arrested him and others using excess force**.*

Notes: Treatments were completely randomized with each participant having an equal probability of receiving any individual treatment.

Political dissent takes on many forms and costs associated with collective action vary. After reading the assigned treatment prompt, we asked study participants to gauge their agreement with three related statements along a five-point Likert scale. First, you would

support the actions the police took. Second, you would publicly criticize the actions the police took. Third, you would protest the actions the police took.

3.3 Survey Sampling

Our survey experiment was conducted between 29 June and 20 July 2018, in 194 parishes located in 180 sub-counties within 127 counties, 100 districts and all 4 regions in Uganda. Table 3 shows the geographical distribution of the sample. The survey was embedded in a round of Twaweza's Sauti za Wananchi project with assistance from Ipsos.[9] Twaweza is a highly respected research firm working throughout east Africa. Sauti za Wananchi is Africa's first nationally representative mobile phone survey.[10]

Table 3: Overview of Multistage Sampling

	Districts		Counties		Sub-Counties		Parishes		Individuals	
	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample
Sample by Region	112	100	181	127	1,368	180	6,547	194	34,844,095	1,920
Central	24	16	36	23	258	36	1,324	43	9,579,119	434
Eastern	32	29	50	35	412	51	2,056	51	9,094,960	492
Northern	30	29	45	34	311	46	1,545	47	7,230,661	460
Western	26	26	50	35	387	47	1,622	53	8,939,355	534

Notes: Data on administrative units from the 2016 Uganda Electoral Commission Zoning.

Twaweza's research team employed a multi-stage stratified sampling approach to achieve a representative sample of the total population of Ugandans who are 18 years and older. The sample frame is based on the 2014 Uganda Population and Housing Census.[11] Given the sensitive nature of the study, our questions were designed in close collaboration with

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[9]Data were collected by experienced call center agents using Computer Aided Telephonic Interviews (CATI). Interviews were conducted in the respondents' preferred language, which was identified during baseline interviews.

[10]Although "face-to-face" surveys are traditionally used for population-based programs, the use of these surveys as baseline data collection instruments, coupled with subsequent interviews from that panel, provides a cost-effective approach to rapid survey collection and opinion monitoring (Dabalen et al. 2016). As in other countries, mobile phones are ubiquitous in Uganda, where 80% own or have access to a cell phone in 2017, with 67% reporting everyday usage (Afrobarometer 2018). Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that data from mobile phones are representative and useful for capturing results similar to those from population-based surveys (for example, the distribution of wealth from local communities to nation-states (Blumenstock, Cadamuro and On 2015).

[11]Twaweza explains the multi-stage sampling design of Sauti za Wananchi in their technical paper.

the research team in Uganda, which contributed to a low refusal rate of 4% (1,920 of 2,000 respondents participated).

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

We argue the provision of law and order is a defining feature of governance. We consider how Ugandans assess the government's provision of security compared to maintaining roads and bridges and ensuring free and fair elections. A question in the baseline survey asked respondents to evaluate the government's performance in "reducing crime (ensuring safety and security)." Responses were roughly split (46% had a negative assessment; 52% had a positive assessment), and these responses were similar to Ugandans' assessment of the government's ability to provide other public goods (see Figure 2). For example, over half (52%) of respondents gave positive assessments of the government's performance in maintaining roads and bridges.[12]

One possible bias could be preference falsification, where respondents do not answer the security question "truthfully" due to its sensitivity. Considering this, we examine responses to a similarly sensitive question: the government's performance in ensuring free and fair elections. Overall, 53% of respondents negatively evaluated the government's performance in ensuring free and fair elections, with 32% saying the government was performing "very badly." Although social desirability bias exerts some influence in surveys about police-citizen interactions (Jackson et al. 2013), the similarity in distribution between road maintenance and government performance reducing crime suggests that effect is minimal. Although the UPF are responsible for ensuring Museveni's political survival and repressing dissent, a large proportion of the population still believes they are doing fairly well at ensuring the safety and security of the population.

Likewise, responses to police repression may be conditioned by existing positive or negative perceptions of the police. When the police are initially viewed as procedurally fair and

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[12]We provide the distribution of demographic factors, including respondents' approval of President Museveni job performance and party affiliation in the online appendix on page 9.

Figure 2: Provision of Public Goods and Perceptions of State Repression

respectful in their interactions with the public (Tankebe 2009, Tyler 1990), respondents may be willing to give the police the benefit of the doubt in repressive situations. Moreover, when the police's actions normatively align with a respondent's viewpoint (Jackson and Bradford 2009), repressive actions against protestors may be interpreted as just. Following previous studies of policing, we measured baseline attitudes of procedural fairness with the following two questions: 1) the police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with; and 2) the police treat people with dignity and respect. Similarly, to capture normative alignment, we asked whether 3) the police usually act in ways consistent with your own ideas about what is right and wrong; and, 4) the police stand up for values that are important to you. We plot these answers in Figure 3. Similarly, we asked respondents whether they believed the police were effective (Jackson et al. 2013, Tankebe 2013) and if they felt obligated to cooperate with them (Tyler and Fagan 2008).[13] We show the distribution of

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[13]Specifically, to gauge effectiveness, we asked whether respondents agreed "the police are not doing a good job in preventing crime in your community" and "if you witnessed a crime happening, you would report

the second set of questions in Figure 4. There is significant variation both across and within these responses suggesting that civilians hold divergent beliefs about the role of the UPF to ensure safety and security.

Figure 3: Attitudes toward the Police: Procedural Fairness and Normative Alignment

Figure 4: Attitudes toward the Police: Obligation and Cooperation

it to the police." To gauge obligation, we asked whether respondents agreed "you should do what the police tell you even if you do not understand or agree with the reasons" and "the police in your community are legitimate authorities and you should do what they tell you to do."

Figure 5: Distribution of Responses by Treatment Groups

Notes: Distribution of responses to three survey questions (support, publicly criticize, and protest) across the four treatment groups: Control (N=491); Treatment 1: Participate Treatment (N=475); Treatment 2: Repression Treatment (N=481); and Treatment 3: Both Participate and Repression Treatments (N=473).

Figure 5 shows the distribution of responses to three survey questions (support, publicly criticize, and protest) across the four treatment groups. Additionally, we plot the distribution of responses by region in Figure 10 of the online appendix. There is considerable heterogeneity within and across study participants' responses and observable variation by region. We also did not have any "refuse to answer" or "don't know" responses. Again, given the sensitive nature of these questions in the context, this was reassuring. We do not expect non-responses to bias our findings. Finally, we can observe preliminary evidence for the backlash hypothesis. Consider, for example, the difference between the proportion of the control group (top-left panel) compared to the treatment 2 and treatment 3 groups (bottom panels). We can already observe variation across the treatments.

3.5 Statistical analyses

We estimate the treatment effects by using the following benchmark Ordinary Least Squares statistical model. Formally, Y_i denotes the response variable for the three outcome measures of interest, *SUPPORT*, *CRITICIZE*, and *PROTEST*. Each outcome variable is modelled by a separate equation, expressed as follows:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T3_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where i indexes respondents, $T1_i$, $T2_i$, and $T3_i$ are indicator variables for the respective randomized "treatment" assignments, which represents the treatment given to i, and ϵ_i captures stochastic error.

We are interested in capturing the effects of the following treatment conditions: 1) i participated in a rally, 2) whether the police used excessive force; and 3) whether the police used excessive force when i participated in a rally. These treatment assignments are captured by the following three parameters: β_1, β_2, and β_3, respectively.[14] As a first-cut to examine

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[14]Although the outcome measure is ordered, we use an OLS models for parsimony in interpretation and because coefficient estimates are unbiased if the model is specified correctly. The models are specified correctly as we only employ dummy variables for the treatment indicators in the model (Wooldridge 2010). To ensure that the results are not model dependent, we also use ordered logistic regression. Results are

backlash effects, we report coefficient plots from Equation 1 in Figure 6.[15]

Figure 6: Main OLS Results

The figure plots the results from three OLS models containing the treatment indicators. Plotted points represent estimated coefficients from the models and the thick and thin horizontal bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Each model includes 1,920 respondents from 194 parishes in Uganda. The reference category is the control condition.

We find robust evidence for the hypothesized "backlash" effect. There is no evidence that repression deters public criticism or political protests. On the contrary, repression in the form of excess police violence decreases support for the police and increases respondents' likelihood to publicly criticize and protest the police's actions.

Comparing the difference between the "bystander" effect and "participation" effects, we find that previous engagement in collective action has no discernible effect on supporting the police's actions when they behave appropriately, but it does increase respondents' willingness to publicly criticize police and engage in future protests.

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robust across the model specifications, reported in Table 8 online appendix page 3

[15]Tabular results reported on page 3 of the appendix.

3.6 Heterogeneous Effects

Figure 7: OLS Results by Incumbent Party Support

The figure plots the results from three OLS models containing the treatment indicators. Plotted points represent estimated coefficients from the models and the thick and thin horizontal bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. The models include 1303 and 617 respondents for NRM supporters and not NRM supporters, respectively. The reference category is the control condition in each model.

In autocracies, police are an extension of the state and controlled by the autocrat to

repress political opponents and threats from below (Hassan 2017, Wantchekon 2002). We expect support for the ruling party to act as a potential moderator to the backlash effects. We subset the sample to consider variation between those who identified as supporting the NRM party compared to those who do not. Figure 7 examines whether supporters of the autocrat's party exhibit different responses to the treatment conditions. As expected, the relationship between repressive action by the police and dissent seem attenuated by support for the ruling party. Surprisingly, the backlash effect remains for those who identify as NRM supporters when they receive the repression treatment.

Existing work suggest that several demographic factors matter for patterns of repression and collective action. Nordås and Davenport (2013), for example, hypothesize that political authorities faced with a youth bulge are more likely to apply repressive measures against their populations than states with a less threatening population-age structure. Additionally, they argue governments will focus their attention on "youth bulges because youth are more likely than other age groups to rebel" (Nordås and Davenport 2013, 937). Similarly, Christensen (2018) argues the geography of repression matters in Sub Saharan Africa, finding state repression is more frequent in urban areas, but states are more likely to kill dissidents in rural areas. Finally, a robust literature suggests that gender matters for patterns of collective action and violence (Agarwal 2000, Ness 2004).

Considering these demographic factors, we consider moderating effects of age, geographic setting, and gender. Although demographics are important, we should expect heterogeneous effects within these groups to be conditioned by pre-treatment support for the ruling party. We report the average treatment effects on potential moderators to support police action (Table 4), publicly criticize police action (Table 5), or protest police action (Table 6).

We regress our treatments on the corresponding demographic conditions: female, male, rural, urban, under 35, and over 35. Additionally, we consider if support for the ruling party affects responses within demographics. Assignment to the participation treatment has no discernible effect on support for police action. However, it increases public criticism from

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Table 4: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Support Police Action

	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	Dependent variable: Support Police Action					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	−0.093	0.103	0.010	−0.052	−0.012	−0.002
	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.077)	(0.153)	(0.103)	(0.093)
T2: Repression	−0.571	−0.399	−0.475	−0.553	−0.579	−0.414
	(0.090)	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.154)	(0.102)	(0.094)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.460	−0.405	−0.366	−0.755	−0.374	−0.492
	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.159)	(0.102)	(0.095)
Control (Observed)	1.145	1.027	1.107	1.022	1.035	1.142
	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.054)	(0.111)	(0.072)	(0.066)
Observations	1,050	870	1,546	374	905	1,015
	Self-Identified NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	−0.017	0.147	0.058	0.048	0.068	0.041
	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.090)	(0.197)	(0.122)	(0.110)
T2: Repression	−0.525	−0.321	−0.457	−0.318	−0.457	−0.413
	(0.109)	(0.130)	(0.092)	(0.200)	(0.123)	(0.114)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.306	−0.300	−0.267	−0.555	−0.301	−0.309
	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.090)	(0.209)	(0.122)	(0.112)
Control (Observed)	1.134	1.058	1.115	1.021	1.047	1.148
	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.064)	(0.146)	(0.087)	(0.080)
Observations	724	579	1,099	204	607	696
	Did not Self-Identify as NRM Supporter					
T1: Participation	−0.293	−0.046	−0.161	−0.190	−0.225	−0.130
	(0.168)	(0.200)	(0.154)	(0.238)	(0.191)	(0.172)
T2: Repression	−0.661	−0.532	−0.512	−0.841	−0.810	−0.416
	(0.159)	(0.182)	(0.138)	(0.235)	(0.178)	(0.159)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.811	−0.657	−0.640	−0.974	−0.525	−0.957
	(0.165)	(0.190)	(0.146)	(0.239)	(0.180)	(0.171)
Control (Observed)	1.167	0.976	1.092	1.023	1.012	1.130
	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.097)	(0.167)	(0.125)	(0.112)
Observations	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 5: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Publicly Criticize Police Action

	Dependent variable: Publicly Criticize Police Action					
	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	0.178	0.108	0.125	0.222	0.083	0.207
	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.077)	(0.146)	(0.102)	(0.091)
T2: Repression	0.292	0.286	0.257	0.408	0.162	0.401
	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.076)	(0.147)	(0.101)	(0.092)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.416	0.338	0.313	0.680	0.291	0.453
	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.076)	(0.152)	(0.101)	(0.093)
Control (Observed)	−0.699	−0.676	−0.703	−0.622	−0.535	−0.824
	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.053)	(0.106)	(0.071)	(0.064)
Observations	1,050	870	1,546	374	905	1,015
	Self-Identified as NRM Supporter					
T1: Participation	0.129	−0.030	0.076	−0.025	0.011	0.110
	(0.109)	(0.130)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.127)	(0.110)
T2: Repression	0.257	0.083	0.139	0.374	0.043	0.300
	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.094)	(0.206)	(0.128)	(0.114)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.311	0.148	0.199	0.485	0.213	0.258
	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.092)	(0.215)	(0.127)	(0.112)
Control (Observed)	−0.659	−0.580	−0.630	−0.596	−0.459	−0.769
	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.066)	(0.150)	(0.091)	(0.080)
Observations	724	579	1,099	204	607	696
	Did not Self-Identify as NRM Supporter					
T1: Participation	0.285	0.377	0.192	0.556	0.212	0.431
	(0.160)	(0.180)	(0.143)	(0.208)	(0.174)	(0.164)
T2: Repression	0.362	0.623	0.498	0.447	0.380	0.583
	(0.150)	(0.164)	(0.129)	(0.205)	(0.162)	(0.151)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.646	0.703	0.576	0.895	0.434	0.909
	(0.157)	(0.171)	(0.136)	(0.209)	(0.164)	(0.163)
Control (Observed)	−0.778	−0.833	−0.855	−0.651	−0.671	−0.924
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.090)	(0.146)	(0.114)	(0.106)
Observations	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 6: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Protest Police Action

	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	Dependent variable: Protest Police Action					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	0.238	0.111	0.164	0.239	0.171	0.196
	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.076)	(0.146)	(0.101)	(0.091)
T2: Repression	0.230	0.261	0.232	0.281	0.178	0.301
	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.076)	(0.147)	(0.100)	(0.091)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.264	0.342	0.258	0.491	0.217	0.373
	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.075)	(0.152)	(0.100)	(0.092)
Control (Observed)	−0.770	−0.775	−0.791	−0.689	−0.687	−0.847
	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.106)	(0.070)	(0.064)
Observations	1,050	870	1,546	374	905	1,015
	Self-Identified as NRM Supporter					
T1: Participation	0.183	−0.041	0.092	0.051	0.097	0.081
	(0.108)	(0.128)	(0.091)	(0.196)	(0.125)	(0.109)
T2: Repression	0.214	0.039	0.119	0.223	0.078	0.188
	(0.111)	(0.131)	(0.093)	(0.199)	(0.127)	(0.113)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.234	0.158	0.167	0.412	0.200	0.201
	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.091)	(0.208)	(0.126)	(0.111)
Control (Observed)	−0.754	−0.674	−0.719	−0.723	−0.635	−0.793
	(0.078)	(0.092)	(0.065)	(0.146)	(0.090)	(0.079)
Observations	724	579	1,099	204	607	696
	Did not Self-Identify as NRM Supporter					
T1: Participation	0.377	0.414	0.311	0.508	0.321	0.468
	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.142)	(0.218)	(0.173)	(0.165)
T2: Repression	0.261	0.632	0.463	0.356	0.363	0.506
	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.128)	(0.215)	(0.161)	(0.152)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.326	0.694	0.458	0.578	0.241	0.772
	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.134)	(0.219)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Control (Observed)	−0.800	−0.940	−0.939	−0.651	−0.780	−0.946
	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.153)	(0.113)	(0.107)
Observations	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

female respondents and those older than 35. Additionally, it increases the probability of future protests against police actions among female, rural, and older respondents, especially for respondents who do not support the NRM.

The repression treatment has a consistent backlash effect on respondents, negatively impacting support for police actions and increasing public criticism and future protests, except for NRM supporters. Interestingly, female NRM supporters were more likely to publicly criticize and protest police action after receiving the repression treatment. Across the various demographic factors, respondents assigned to the participation and repression treatment were less likely to support police action and more likely to publicly criticize and/or protest police action. These results hold even for NRM supporters, except for male respondents and those under 35. Unsurprisingly, excessive force by police at a rally strongly influences how members of the opposition respond, triggering backlash effects. However, these results demonstrate police repression also increases dissent among women and older respondents – even for those who identify as supporting the ruling party.

In addition to demographic factors, we also consider how respondents' pre-test attitudes toward the police affect their responses. Considering the moderating effects of attitudes and beliefs about the role of police as legitimate authorities and individuals' obligation to obey police, willingness to report crimes, and normative alignment conditions their level of support and likelihood to publicly criticize and protest police actions. Results are consistent with the findings discussed here. Treatments 2 and 3 decreased support for police action among all respondents and increased public criticism and protest among most groups. The only group without a discernible effect on public criticism and protest were those who said they were obligated to obey police. [16] Importantly, there is no evidence that excessive police violence *deters* future collective action or dissent.

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[16]We report these results in Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 in the online appendix.

4   Discussion and Conclusion

We test the classic assumption that repression deters political dissent. Rather than focusing on the politics of repression, we argue that we need to compare provisions of security by police compared to excessive force. Previous studies overlook that police are tasked with providing law and order in addition to repressing political dissent. For civilians, whether they believe the police are providing law and order as a public good or repressing political dissent conditions how they respond to actions taken by the police. The general consensus is that governments repress to deter political dissent. We question the logic of using repression to deter political dissent. We argue repressive actions taken by the police, and not appropriate police force, should result in powerful backlash effects decreasing support for police and triggering political dissent.

Recognizing the costs of political dissent in autocracies, we also consider the conditioning relationship of bystanding compared to participating in the political event. Civilians who identify with a political event should be more likely to express their "true preferences" about future political engagement or dissent. We test these assumptions with a survey experiment of 1,920 respondents in 194 parishes in Uganda. Our survey experiment was conducted in the weeks before the arrests, torture, and trial of several opposition leaders, including Robert Kyangulany Ssentamu. The results of our study demonstrate the limits of repression to deter political dissent.

We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, by employing experimental evidence from an authoritarian context, we demonstrate the limits of repression in deterring political dissent. Specifically, we show that repression results in "backlash" effects decreasing support for police and increasing public criticism and future protests. By examining the politics of policing in an autocracy, we show excessive state-violence triggers political backlash, increasing expressions of political dissent and decreasing support for the security apparatus. This is the first study – that we know – that provides micro-level experimental evidence on the protest-repression nexus debate from within an autocracy. Autocrats are

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likely to continue to repress to deter political opposition. However, our study demonstrates the futility of that violence.

Second, we address the endogeneity problem by examining whether "bystander" or "participation" effects condition on civilians' responses to police action. This provides the first experimental design meant to address the protest-repression nexus debate. Third, we expand the research on the politics of policing arguing that even in authoritarian contexts, we need to focus on the multiple dimensions of policing. Police are the actors responsible for implementing repression but they are also the agents responsible for providing law and order. The existing literature on human rights and state repression has not addressed that even autocracies must provide law and order and security for civilians, as a basic expression of governance.

Beyond our experiment, these results were borne out during political events that unfolded in Uganda in the weeks following our survey. Similar to our findings, repressive actions by Uganda's security forces, including the army and police forces, sparked additional protests and political dissent throughout Uganda. Our findings and unfolding political events in Uganda demonstrate the costs of repression to autocrats. Excessive police violence decreases support for police and increases public criticisms and future protests.

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5 Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Table 7: Main tabular results from OLS regressions. Results used in Figure 6.

Table 8: Ordered logistic regression models for robustness checks for Figure 6.

Table 9 Tabular OLS results by party support. Results used in Figure 7.

Table 10 Ordered logistic regression models for robustness checks for Figure 7.

Table 11 Ordered logistic regression models for robustness checks for Table 4.

Table 12 Ordered logistic regression models for robustness checks for Table 5.

Table 13 Ordered logistic regression models for robustness checks for Table 6.

Table 14: Average treatment effects on potential moderators to support police action by attitudes and beliefs toward police.

Table 15: Average treatment effects on potential moderators to publicly criticize police action by attitudes and beliefs toward police.

Table 16: Average treatment effects on potential moderators to protest police action by attitudes and beliefs toward police.

Figure 8: Histograms of respondents' demographics.

Figure 9: Histograms of respondents' political affiliation and approval of the president.

Figure 10: Histograms of dependent variable responses by region.

6   Supporting Information: Online Appendix

Table 7: Tabular OLS Results: Figure 6

	Support	Publicly Criticize	Protest
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
T1: Participation	−0.005	0.147	0.182
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)
T2: Repression	−0.493	0.289	0.244
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.067)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.436	0.380	0.300
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Constant	1.092	−0.688	−0.772
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.047)
N	1920	1920	1920
R-squared	0.044	0.018	0.012
Adj. R-squared	0.043	0.017	0.010

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 8: Ordered Logistic Regression Models: Robustness Check Figure 6

	Support	Publicly Criticize	Protest
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
T1: Participation	−0.102	0.268	0.311
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.118)
T2: Repression	−0.835	0.504	0.429
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.119)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.687	0.661	0.519
	(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.119)
N	1920	1920	1920

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordered logistic regression, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 9: Tabular OLS Results: Figure 7

	Support NRM supporter	Publicly Criticize NRM supporter	Protest NRM supporter	Support Not NRM supporter	Publicly Criticize Not NRM supporter	Protest Not NRM supporter
T1: Participation	0.055	0.060	0.399	−0.176	0.328	0.399
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.119)	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.119)
T2: Repression	−0.435	0.181	0.438	−0.598	0.487	0.438
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.111)
T3: Part. & Repression	−0.305	0.237	0.502	−0.737	0.674	0.502
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Constant	1.101	−0.625	−0.868	1.075	−0.805	−0.868
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.078)
N	1303	1303	617	617	617	617
R-squared	0.037	0.008	0.038	0.070	0.058	0.038
Adj. R-squared	0.034	0.005	0.034	0.066	0.053	0.034

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 10: Ordered Logistic Regression Models: Robustness Check Figure 7

	Support NRM supporter	Publicly Criticize NRM supporter	Protest NRM supporter	Support Not NRM supporter	Publicly Criticize Not NRM supporter	Protest Not NRM supporter
T1: Participation	−0.036	0.108	0.158	−0.340	0.629	0.681
	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.218)
T2: Repression	−0.753	0.306	0.250	−1.004	0.905	0.780
	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.203)
T3: Part. & Repression	−0.522	0.406	0.351	−1.141	1.230	0.893
	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.219)	(0.213)	(0.212)
N	1303	1303	1303	617	617	617

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordered logistic regression, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 11: Ordered Logistic Regression: Support Police Action

	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	Dependent variable: Support Police Action					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	−0.233	0.054	−0.088	−0.133	−0.136	−0.077
	(0.161)	(0.177)	(0.133)	(0.273)	(0.176)	(0.161)
T2: Repression	−0.982	−0.667	−0.800	−0.993	−0.996	−0.698
	(0.165)	(0.179)	(0.135)	(0.280)	(0.179)	(0.165)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.713	−0.649	−0.572	−1.271	−0.625	−0.743
	(0.168)	(0.179)	(0.135)	(0.294)	(0.178)	(0.170)
N	1050	870	1546	374	905	1015
	Self-Identified as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	−0.168	0.131	−0.039	0.0001	−0.055	−0.022
	(0.192)	(0.218)	(0.157)	(0.374)	(0.216)	(0.194)
T2: Repression	−0.935	−0.530	−0.778	−0.629	−0.871	−0.646
	(0.204)	(0.228)	(0.166)	(0.390)	(0.225)	(0.207)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.501	−0.538	−0.444	−1.071	−0.621	−0.435
	(0.203)	(0.221)	(0.161)	(0.402)	(0.220)	(0.203)
N	724	579	1099	204	607	696
	Didn't Self-Identify as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	−0.467	−0.206	−0.326	−0.329	−0.433	−0.262
	(0.300)	(0.311)	(0.257)	(0.405)	(0.310)	(0.302)
T2: Repression	−1.107	−0.894	−0.866	−1.407	−1.279	−0.821
	(0.287)	(0.291)	(0.236)	(0.407)	(0.301)	(0.279)
T3: Participation & Repression	−1.279	−0.994	−0.997	−1.579	−0.716	−1.610
	(0.306)	(0.315)	(0.254)	(0.438)	(0.308)	(0.317)
N	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordered logistic regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 12: Ordered Logistic Regression: Publicly Criticize Police Action

	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	Dependent variable: Publicly Criticize Police Action					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	0.317	0.207	0.234	0.418	0.162	0.362
	(0.158)	(0.175)	(0.130)	(0.273)	(0.172)	(0.160)
T2: Repression	0.523	0.482	0.441	0.777	0.289	0.690
	(0.160)	(0.175)	(0.131)	(0.273)	(0.172)	(0.162)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.735	0.576	0.532	1.273	0.496	0.798
	(0.162)	(0.174)	(0.131)	(0.280)	(0.171)	(0.165)
N	1050	870	1546	374	905	1015
	Self-Identified as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	0.217	−0.028	0.124	0.034	0.044	0.166
	(0.187)	(0.214)	(0.153)	(0.366)	(0.209)	(0.191)
T2: Repression	0.432	0.153	0.224	0.754	0.086	0.490
	(0.195)	(0.220)	(0.159)	(0.375)	(0.214)	(0.200)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.514	0.279	0.319	0.947	0.365	0.431
	(0.194)	(0.215)	(0.156)	(0.380)	(0.210)	(0.197)
N	724	579	1099	204	607	696
	Didn't Self-Identify as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	0.563	0.702	0.460	1.009	0.384	0.872
	(0.298)	(0.310)	(0.253)	(0.416)	(0.307)	(0.302)
T2: Repression	0.742	1.082	0.936	0.839	0.676	1.137
	(0.285)	(0.293)	(0.238)	(0.406)	(0.292)	(0.287)
T3: Participation & Repression	1.252	1.206	1.059	1.733	0.753	1.712
	(0.296)	(0.308)	(0.248)	(0.422)	(0.297)	(0.308)
N	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordered logistic regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 13: Ordered Logistic Regression: Protest Police Action

	Female	Male	Rural	Urban	Under 35	35 and older
	Dependent variable: Protest Police Action					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Respondents					
T1: Participation	0.400	0.203	0.286	0.405	0.290	0.335
	(0.160)	(0.175)	(0.132)	(0.273)	(0.174)	(0.161)
T2: Repression	0.412	0.451	0.409	0.509	0.301	0.542
	(0.162)	(0.176)	(0.132)	(0.274)	(0.173)	(0.163)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.447	0.600	0.436	0.909	0.345	0.673
	(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.132)	(0.279)	(0.173)	(0.165)
N	1050	870	1546	374	905	1015
	Self-Identified as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	0.315	−0.031	0.164	0.139	0.198	0.130
	(0.191)	(0.214)	(0.155)	(0.367)	(0.211)	(0.193)
T2: Repression	0.380	0.092	0.214	0.446	0.156	0.328
	(0.198)	(0.222)	(0.161)	(0.375)	(0.216)	(0.202)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.374	0.317	0.277	0.830	0.349	0.347
	(0.198)	(0.215)	(0.157)	(0.385)	(0.213)	(0.199)
N	724	579	1099	204	607	696
	Didn't Self-Identify as NRM Supporters					
T1: Participation	0.622	0.739	0.554	0.843	0.494	0.871
	(0.299)	(0.318)	(0.258)	(0.412)	(0.311)	(0.306)
T2: Repression	0.483	1.112	0.833	0.619	0.578	0.985
	(0.281)	(0.294)	(0.235)	(0.407)	(0.292)	(0.284)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.613	1.217	0.814	1.038	0.312	1.457
	(0.293)	(0.310)	(0.248)	(0.410)	(0.300)	(0.303)
N	326	291	447	170	298	319

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordered logistic regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 14: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Support Police Action

	All	Police are legitimate authorities	Obligated to obey police	Would Report a crime to police	Normatively aligned with police
	Dependent variable: Support Police Action				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T1: Participation	−0.005	−0.054	−0.035	−0.035	0.010
	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.173)	(0.077)	(0.110)
T2: Repression	−0.493	−0.517	−0.473	−0.498	−0.385
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.171)	(0.077)	(0.109)
T3: Participation & Repression	−0.436	−0.556	−0.735	−0.485	−0.290
	(0.069)	(0.086)	(0.170)	(0.076)	(0.110)
Control (Observed)	1.092	1.262	1.123	1.201	1.169
	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.121)	(0.054)	(0.078)
Observations	1,920	1,142	328	1,464	695

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 15: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Publicly Criticize Police Action

	Dependent variable: Publicly Criticize Police Action				
	All	Police are legitimate authorities	Obligated to obey police	Would Report a crime to police	Normatively aligned with police
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T1: Participation	0.147	0.203	0.089	0.133	0.072
	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.169)	(0.078)	(0.120)
T2: Repression	0.289	0.288	−0.037	0.264	0.255
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.167)	(0.078)	(0.119)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.380	0.443	0.140	0.383	0.345
	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.166)	(0.077)	(0.120)
Control (Observed)	−0.688	−0.880	−0.481	−0.743	−0.727
	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.119)	(0.055)	(0.085)
Observations	1,920	1,142	328	1,464	695

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 16: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Moderators to Protest Police Action

	Dependent variable: Protest Police Action				
	All	Police are legitimate authorities	Obligated to obey police	Would Report a crime to police	Normatively aligned with police
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T1: Participation	0.182	0.204	0.113	0.139	0.130
	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.167)	(0.076)	(0.120)
T2: Repression	0.244	0.238	−0.071	0.215	0.217
	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.165)	(0.076)	(0.120)
T3: Participation & Repression	0.300	0.358	0.108	0.322	0.294
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.164)	(0.075)	(0.121)
Control (Observed)	−0.772	−0.939	−0.543	−0.820	−0.797
	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.117)	(0.053)	(0.085)
Observations	1,920	1,142	328	1,464	695

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the repression and participation treatments, using the control (observed a rally) as reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure 8: Respondents' Demographics

Figure 9: Respondents' Political Affiliation

Figure 10: Survey Responses by Regions