

# Deterring Threat and Settling Scores: How Coups Influence Respect for Physical Integrity Rights

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## **Abstract**

We argue political uncertainty from coups decreases respect for physical integrity rights. Post-coup regimes preemptively repress as a show of strength to deter threats from those excluded from power and settle scores through cycles of retaliation. Additionally, we argue the retaliation cycle of score settling will last longer after a failed coup because of informational problems that emerge when targeting opponents. Employing data on coups and physical integrity rights from 1980 to 2015, we find coup failure and success are negatively associated with respect for physical integrity rights, and the cycle of retaliation lasts longer after failed coups.

**Keywords:** Bargaining failure, Coups, Human rights, Repression, Conflict

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# 1 Introduction

Do coups affect patterns of political violence like violations of physical integrity rights? Do these patterns vary depending on whether coups succeed or fail? In July 2016, the Turkish government under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan successfully suppressed a coup attempt by Turkish military officials. The initial days were filled with bloodshed as the coup plotters within the military attacked government institutions and clashed with security forces and Erdogan-supporting civilians in the streets. Citizens responded to Erdogan’s call for protestors to take to the streets in Istanbul and the coup unraveled (Arango and Yeginsu 2016; Shaheen 2016). 265 people were killed, including 100 coup plotters. Three days after the coup was foiled, 2,800 members of the Turkish military were arrested, arrest warrants were issued for nearly 200 court members, and 10 members of Turkey’s highest administrative court were detained (Shaheen 2016).

By October 2016, international news agencies reported that post-coup arrests in Turkey climbed to 70,756 including military officials, judges and university professors (Editorial Board 2016; Fisk 2016). Erdogan and his allies purged the judiciary and the police of those linked to the suspected coup-plotters, referring to them as a terrorist organization (Arango and Yeginsu 2016).<sup>1</sup> Yet following the failed coup, the regime repressed actors beyond the security forces and judiciary, including university professors, political opponents, and citizens. If these events reflect the deterioration of physical integrity rights after a failed coup-attempt, what implications do they have, if any, on the effect of coups on physical integrity rights violations in general?<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Vowing payback, Erdogan threatened the coup-plotters, saying “those who stain the military’s reputation must leave. The process has started today, and it will continue, just as we fight other terrorist groups” (Kenner and Francis 2016).

<sup>2</sup>Similar violations in physical integrity rights likely follow successful coups. In Zimbabwe, for example, President Robert Mugabe was removed from office by a coup in November 2017 after 37 years in power. The coup opened the door for Zimbabwe’s first transition of leadership since 1980 and elections were held on July 30, 2018. Yet between the coups and election, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led by Emmerson Mnangagwa and Zimbabwe’s security forces engaged in score settling, targeting political opponents within ZANU–PF and the opposition, engaging in shows of repressive strength to deter would be political challengers. Even in the days following Zimbabwe’s election, Zimbabwe’s police beat and arrested dozens of opposition supporters and Mnangagwa’s backers conducted house-to-house searches

Coups and state repression involve members of the state security apparatus.<sup>3</sup> Yet few theoretical or empirical studies have linked coups to physical integrity rights violation. Rather scholars contend coups d'état in more authoritarian contexts are likely to open the door to democracy, especially in countries more dependent on Western aid, transitioning autocrats out and democratically elected leaders in (Chacha and Powell 2017; Gürsoy 2012; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Miller 2016; Powell 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016; Varol 2017). Marinov and Goemans (2014) argue that “the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.”

Given that competitive elections are associated with improvements in physical integrity rights conditions, successful coups could be good news for human rights conditions (Marinov and Goemans 2014). Yet Derpanopoulos et al. (2016) find coups are likely to result in higher levels of state-sanctioned violence. Consequently, we address two seemingly contradictory bodies of knowledge. On one hand we know coups are marked by violence, sparking cycles of repression and violence (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016). Yet on the other hand, there is a growing literature linking coups to democratization (Chacha and Powell 2017; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Miller 2016; Powell 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016).

Moreover, coups occur in democracies and autocracies. From 1980 to 2015, for example, there were 199 coup attempts with 98 succeeding and 101 failing. Certainly coups are more frequent in non-democracies (88%), but they also occur in democracies (12%).<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, we need to consider the implications for coups for physical integrity rights in both democracies and autocracies before assuming increased security sector engagement is a viable pathway to more democratic outcomes.

Coups generate political uncertainty about who is in power; in particular, who controls the security apparatus. Understanding social unrest and political violence in post-coup environments requires a theory of why leaders are likely to use repression following a coup

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for opposition leaders.

<sup>3</sup>We define a coup as the “illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011).

<sup>4</sup>Democracy operationalized as states scoring 6 or higher on Polity 4 when the coup took place.

regardless of regime type. Rather than focusing on variation within regime types, we examine whether failed and successful coups d'état affect state repression and, if so, to what extent these effects persist over time.

To answer these questions, we develop and test a theory explaining why patterns of state repression vary following successful and failed coups. Our theory provides an explanation for why coups increase physical integrity rights violations regardless of whether they fail or succeed. We argue successful and failed coups are a result of elite bargaining failure – often between members of the security apparatus and the ruling coalition. This generates political uncertainty likely to decrease respect for physical integrity right as post-coup regimes employ preemptive repressive tactics to maintain control and deter political challengers. Our theory identifies two possible mechanisms. First, post-coup regimes preemptively repress as a show of strength to *deter threats* from those excluded from power. Second, post-coup regimes repress to *settle scores* against known political opponents.

Although regimes are likely to preemptively repress to deter threats and settle scores following both failed and successful coups, we argue incomplete information about who to target following a failed coup leads to a more persistent *retaliation cycle* – the period of time regimes employ repression to settle scores. The retaliation cycle will last longer following failed coups because incumbent regimes are less effective at identifying would-be political opponents.

Empirically, we find coups increase violations of physical integrity rights in the post coup period as states continue to rely on violence as a means to control civilians. While previous scholars have highlighted the role of coups in eventual democratization, we contribute to this debate by examining whether the same process also leads to improvement or deterioration in respect for physical integrity rights. Our results indicate that even though coups remain a likely means to transition power in autocracies, both failed and successful coups result in a significant *increase* in physical integrity rights abuses. Negative effects of coups on physical integrity rights persist longer following failed coups compared to successful ones.

These findings address the ongoing discussion about whether the international community should pressure domestic actors – security forces – to meddle in authoritarian politics.

Theoretically, the ability of the military or security forces to rein in the abuse of executive power is likely to be linked to the repressive capacity of the security forces. Regardless of the success or failure of the coup, the involvement of the security forces in day to day politics seems to increase repression. Namely, the good news about coups and democracy does not seem to be good news for coups and human rights (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016). This seems to be the case regardless of whether or not the coup-entrepreneurs fail or succeed in seizing control of the state.

Practically, our study offers several important policy implications. We suggest that we should be more cautious about praising coups as a constraining mechanism on authoritarian politics. Coups are powerful precisely because security forces employ their repressive capacity in unconstitutional means through either direct or indirect violence (the threat) against the ruling elites. Resolving political disputes through violence likely increases the probability that violence will be used again to solve other political threats. We observe this with coup behavior, as past coups are likely to increase future coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003). Similarly, we argue coups are likely to increase other unconstitutional mechanisms to maintain control like relying on security forces to repress political opponents through arrests, torture, disappearances, and assassinations.

## 2 Linking Coups and State Repression

Existing work on coups addresses how dictators and democratically elected leaders coup-proof to mitigate coup threats by incentivizing loyalty and de incentivizing coup-plotting (Bell 2016; De Bruin 2017; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000; Geddes 2003; Harkness 2016; Sutter 2000). There are two broad approaches to coup-proofing: first, strategies to reduce the “disposition” of elites to attempt a coup; and second, tactics to reduce the likelihood

that a coup attempt would be successful (Powell 2012).

Governments address the first challenge of deterring coups by directly controlling the military personal recruitment and advancement of security officers. For example, incumbents align the military apparatus with their own interests, making it less appealing for the security forces to take direct action against the regime (Brown, Fariss and McMahon 2016; Feaver 1999). One prominent way many leaders in multiethnic societies coup-proof is stacking security sector with coethnic members (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Harkness 2016; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011).<sup>5</sup> Alternatively, leaders create parallel military forces as a counter-balance strategy, thus imposing barriers to organizing against the regime (Brown, Fariss and McMahon 2016; Dragu and Lupu 2018; Powell 2012; Quinlivan 1999).<sup>6</sup> Yet, counterbalancing the security apparatus is costly because it reduces the effectiveness of the security forces to deter threats from outside the country or threats of rebellion from within (Biddle and Long 2004; Greitens 2016; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Quinlivan 1999). The coup-proofing literature highlights the role of information and bargaining between the ruling coalition and the security apparatus, and the necessary trade-off that occurs from each coup-proofing strategy.

Considering causes and consequences of coups, several studies focus on the role of the military. Security forces have the opportunity and capability to intervene to oust the government (Powell and Thyne 2011; Singh 2014; Svulik 2013). As an extension of the military's role in coups, others explain the links between coups and conflict (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Bell 2016; Bodea, Elbadawi and Houle 2016; Houle 2016; Roessler 2011).

Other studies consider the structural determinants likely to correlate with conflict and coups. Low income, inequality, a lack of economic growth and past coups, for example,

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<sup>5</sup>Quinlivan (1999), for example, argues leaders stack their security apparatus with “groups with special loyalties” as a coup-proofing strategy. Similarly, Roessler (2011, 303) contends that “rulers are more likely to exclude groups that represent a credible threat to their political survival than other, less powerful ones” connecting the politics of elite accommodation, and ethnic brokerage into the study of civil war.

<sup>6</sup>The Revolutionary Guard in Iran is a clear example of this strategy, as the Ayatollah, suspicious of the Iranian army, consolidated several paramilitary groups in 1979 to effectively counter threats posed by the army. The Revolutionary Guard is approximately one-third the size of the full Iranian Army.

are expected to increase the likelihood of coups (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Londregan 1990; Svobik 2012). Civil wars, coups and riots are likely to have the same structural determinants (Bodea, Elbadawi and Houle 2016).

Although studies have examined the implications of coup-proofing on military and conflict effectiveness (Biddle and Long 2004; Greitens 2016; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Quinlivan 1999), we know less about patterns of state repression in the aftermath of coup activity. Rather than addressing this theoretical gap, recent work on coups explores the link between coups and democratization (Chacha and Powell 2017; Gürsoy 2012; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Miller 2016; Powell 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016; Varol 2017).

We step back from the debate on whether coups open the door to democratization to consider the effects of coups on physical integrity rights. By considering whether political uncertainty about the role of the security apparatus conditions the post-coup environment (De Mesquita 2005; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Svobik 2012), we argue bargaining failure between elites that leads to coups has important implications for the level of respect for physical integrity rights within a state. Successful and failed coups are frequently violent endeavors, generating political uncertainty about who holds the monopoly of power. In the aftermath of coups attempts, the same repressive apparatus is often left in place. In this environment, the use of force – the threat or deployment of violence – remains a viable tool to maintain power and repress those excluded from power, reducing respect for physical integrity rights (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Escriba-Folch 2013).

We focus on physical integrity rights violations associated with violations of human rights like extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and political imprisonment. Violations of physical integrity rights relate to episodes of state repression. State repression is defined by actions the state takes to impose costs on individuals or organizations to keep them from challenging the political status quo. Although there are subtle forms of state repression, we focus on state repression that map to our theoretical mechanisms of deterring threats and settling scores.

Within the physical integrity rights literature, many of the structural factors associated with coups – except for past coups – correlate with state repression or decreased physical integrity rights. Though the connection between repression and dissent has been found to be either positive, negative or U-Shaped, most theorize that during periods of political instability, the regime becomes more unstable, likely leading to increased repression.<sup>7</sup> However, despite the links between coups, unrest, and physical integrity rights violations, scholars have only recently explored their empirical relationship.

The existing theoretical gap between coups and physical integrity rights violations are problematic as political turmoil is likely to generate negative externalities. Yet the latest wave of research on the consequences of coup activity has been quite sanguine about the democratizing effects of coups. Marinov and Goemans (2014), for example, argue that while a new regime that follows a successful coup is by definition authoritarian, the incentives to organize a coup in the first place must correspond to the median voter’s preferred point. When the pre-coup regime shifts too far from the median voter, the military may intervene as a “guardian coup” in order to remove a corrupt regime. If we are to take this policy prescription seriously, we need a better understanding of the relationship between coups and physical integrity rights.

Coups engender political and social instability, which are likely to spark collective action and protests.<sup>8</sup> Given that civilians can influence coup dynamics (Casper and Tyson 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016), we need to also consider the role civil resistance might have surrounding coup activity as coups impact both political and economic stability. Existing studies suggest that we can view coups – both coup successes and failures – as a function of bargaining failure within the ruling coalition. Svobik (2012) defines a ruling coalition as “a set of individuals who support a dictator and, jointly with him, hold enough power to

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<sup>7</sup>See Danneman and Ritter (2014); Gupta, Singh and Sprague (1993); Gurr (1970); Lichbach (1987); Moore (1998); Muller and Weede (1990)

<sup>8</sup>See Gupta, Singh and Sprague (1993); Gurr (1970); Lichbach (1987); Moore (1998); Muller and Weede (1990).

guarantee a regime’s survival.<sup>9</sup> We know that bargaining failure occurs through the lack of information. We argue the same causal mechanism that leads to coups – incomplete information – is likely to increase human rights abuses in the aftermath of coup activity.

### 3 Theoretical Mechanisms

We begin by arguing that coup activity is a signal of political instability and engenders a political uncertain environment in the post-coup period. Coups generate political uncertainty because they are an observable breakdown within the ruling coalition.<sup>10</sup> When actors excluded from power observe a coup, they are likely to update their beliefs about whether they can credibly threaten to take control.

We argue political actors take action to retain power and that their political survival is linked to others (De Mesquita 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2006; Svobik 2009). So first we assume political elites, even those experiencing political uncertainty from a coup, want to maintain power. Second, we assume elites are rational actors who engage in forward thinking (Danneman and Ritter 2014). Accordingly, elites who control power – survive a coup or successfully carry out a coup – are likely to preemptively engage in repression to deter would-be challengers or settle scores by targeting political opponents.

#### 3.1 Deterring Threats

Regardless of the level of threat from the civilian population, elites in a post coup environment are likely to increase repression to preemptively deter would be challengers.<sup>11</sup> Repression is one of the tools dictators may elect to use in order to signal strength to *deter threats*. Escriba-Folch (2013), for example, argues that repression can be used as an effective

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<sup>9</sup>Conceptually, the ruling coalition is similar to De Mesquita (2005) winning coalition.

<sup>10</sup>Certainly, closet coups occur where there are unobserved power plays within elite power circles. However, these events are outside the scope of this paper because they are not observed by the general public.

<sup>11</sup>Danneman and Ritter (2014), in a similar argument, show that autocrats are likely to preemptively employ repression to deter rebel contagion. They contend that forward looking elites will “anticipate the incentive-altering effects of civil wars abroad and increase repression at home to preempt potential rebellion.”

signal, to dismay potential competitors from challenging the dictator's rule (in this case the post-coup winners). Scholars have studied the self-perpetuating cycle between repression and dissent or what Davenport (2007) calls "the law of coercive responsiveness." No matter the outcome of the coup, any coup activity suggests that the status quo is challenged, which is likely the result of the breakdown or failure of elite bargaining. We observe coups as a result of bargaining failure among the ruling coalition or a struggle within the security sector as actors challenge the incumbent's monopoly of violence. However, in the aftermath of a coup, threats emerge to the status quo. That is, there is uncertainty about the strength or weaknesses of the regime. In this environment, the surviving ruling coalition is likely to engage in preemptive repression as a signal of strength. Moreover, the effect of coups on state repression are likely to persist until the regime can return to the previous state of the world or establish a new status quo.

### 3.2 Settling Scores

A second separate but similar pathway by which incomplete information influences physical integrity rights and state repression is through elites using the post-coup environment to *settle scores*. Because coups reflect a bargaining breakdown, which often includes violence, the post-coup regime will need to ensure that its opponents will not attempt to challenge it again in the near future. This creates a distinct difference between successful coups and failed coups, with respect to information.

Successful coups indicate that a new regime is in place, and the people involved in the coup-activity will be acknowledged and rewarded by it. Thus, the post-coup information environment allows the new regime to reward its followers and incentivizes actors to reveal credible information about the coup-plotters. Furthermore, the new regime can use its newly acquired state-power to ensure that the main actors of the previous regime will not attempt to counter-coup. Especially since the identity and networks of these actors have been within the public's purview for the duration of the previous regime.

On the other hand, coups which presented a credible threat to the regime, but failed, may similarly lead the post-coup regime to quell any future attempt against its detractors. But this environment creates a larger incomplete information problem - the post-coup regime doesn't know who the coup-plotters were, except for the direct participants, and more importantly the depth of its anti-regime activity.

This pathway is likely to have a lingering effect on physical integrity rights when a coup fails. We refer to this mechanism as the *retaliatory cycle* of coup activity. Namely, bargaining failure among elites are likely to result in actors settling scores among the various sides, which is likely to result in a systematic decline in respect for physical integrity rights. We argue that the retaliatory cycle is likely to last longer in failed coups relative to successful ones.

There are two likely reasons for this: First, if the coup is successful, the new regime will have better information on who the actors were who were loyal to the ousted regime. This suggests that the new regime will either be able to effectively target political elites loyal to the old-guard or bring them back to the bargaining table. However, if there is a coup failure, the incumbent having defeated the coup-attempt is likely to engage in sustained repression to root out opposition. Second, as Thyne and Powell argue coup first-movers are likely those who have exhausted other alternatives for policy change before plotting a coup. They suggest that this is likely "to cause a significant improvement in the status quo" (2016). This improvement to the status quo will be realized sooner if the coup was successful relative to a failed coup.

Consider for example, the illustrative case of Turkey's failed coup in 2016. The regime accused exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen of a vast conspiracy to overthrow the regime. While several thousands of military members and academics were arrested in the immediate aftermath of the coup, the arbitrary arrest, torture and general suppression of dissent continues two years later under the guise of a continuing national security threat. With over 160,000 arrested in the last two years, including over 100 extrajudicial arrests in Europe, the state is even building new prisons to house the extraordinary number of political prisoners.

These excessive violations of physical integrity rights, we argue, are a direct result of the uncertainty Erdogan’s post-coup regime faces. The allegations of a vast conspiracy, many members of which are still at large, allow for the continued arrest and seizure of dissidents. A year after the coup attempt, Erdogan was asked when the state of emergency would end, to which he responded that it will end when “this business is completely out of the way” (Srivastava 2017). Two years after the coup attempt, the business of settling scores with would-be opponents has still not been completed.

While the failed coup in Turkey led to a relatively long retaliatory cycle, the case of the successful 2014 coup in Thailand illustrates a shorter retaliatory cycles in the post coup environment. The coup itself was bloodless, but it also led to mass arrests of former regime members. In the coups’ immediate aftermath, protests were actively suppressed by the military, including arrests of any public display of dissent, even those who stated such opinions on social media.

In Thailand, the new regime demonstrated its strength in the immediate aftermath to prevent any destabilizing opposition activity by deterring threats and settling scores, arresting dissidents. The spokesman of the junta said just weeks after the coup that if there were obvious forms of resistance “then we have to control it so it doesn’t cause any disorder in the country” (Groll 2014). After the arrests were completed, the regime tried to convince people to return to normalcy by staging festivals including music and performances under the tag line of “Happiness Returns to the Public.”<sup>12</sup>

We argue the new regime in Thailand had less uncertainty over who the members of the previous regime were. This informational advantage led to a retaliatory cycle of settling scores which was much shorter. While those arrested in the coup have not been released, the US State Department report on Thailand in 2016 stated that the regime maintained control over the security forces and no new coup-related violations occurred (US State Department 2016). While the military regime has cemented its position in power, and has not lived up

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<sup>12</sup>Similar to what Thyne and Powell (2016) argue, the regime expended political capital trying to signal that the coup would lead to improvements over the previous status quo.

to its promise to bring democracy, the political dissent associated with the previous regime has been muted (Kurlantzick 2017).

Our theory illustrates the main difference between the information environments after a failed or a successful coup. In Turkey and Thailand, both regimes engaged in physical integrity violations to deter post-coup would-be challengers from presenting a credible challenge and settled scores with political opponents. Both regimes have stayed in power since the coups. But what explains the difference in the length of the retaliatory cycles between Thailand and Turkey? We argue the increased uncertainty in the aftermath of a failed coup leads to a longer retaliatory cycle of repression, relative to a successful coup.

Table 1 illustrates the theoretical frame. Given the uncertainty that surrounds coups, regardless of the outcome, the regime is likely to increase state repression as a way to deter threats and settle scores. Leaders and coup participants must decide what actions to take after a state experiences a successful or failed coup. Any coup activity implies a breakdown in elite bargaining and increased political uncertainty.

Table 1: Theoretical Expectations

	Coup Activity	
	Successful Coup	Failed Coup
Deterring Threats	Decrease in Respect for Physical Integrity Rights	Decrease in Respect for Physical Integrity Rights
Settling Scores	Shorter Retaliatory Cycle	Longer Retaliatory Cycle

If our theory is correct, we should observe a decrease in physical integrity rights as leaders who hold power post-coup repress preemptively to deter threats that emerge from those excluded from power. Furthermore, coups engenders cycles of retaliation as leaders use coups as an opportunity for settling scores among the political elites. Given successful coups provide leaders with better information about political opponents, our theory generates the following observable implications.

**Hypothesis 1** (*Deterring Threats*) *Any coup activity is likely to decrease respect for physical integrity rights.*

**Hypothesis 2** (*Settling Scores*) *Relative to successful coups, failed coups are likely to have a longer retaliatory cycle.*

## 4 Research Design and Empirical Analysis

To test these hypotheses, we construct a global dataset that includes 172 country observations from 1980 to 2015 for a total of 3,629 country-year observations.<sup>13</sup>

### 4.1 Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the level of respect for physical integrity rights, measured at the country-year level. We employ the Latent Human Rights Protection Score (LHRPS), which measures respect for physical integrity rights including political killings, disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests. Fariss (2014a) develops this latent measure of repression and physical integrity rights violations. It builds on previous measures of physical integrity rights such as the Political Terror Score (PTS) and the Cingranelli-Richards measure (CIRI) and also includes relevant events data. Importantly, the dynamic latent measure accounts for changes, over time, in the standards of accountability in the reports which serve as the foundation for the production of PTS and CIRI annual measures. Using this latent variable allows for a continuous and more unbiased measure of physical integrity violations. (Fariss 2014b). We use the LHRPS for our main analysis and robustness checks use PTS and CIRI as well.<sup>14</sup> The LHRPS data are continuous and range between roughly -3 to 5, where higher scores refer to higher levels of respect for physical integrity rights, with a standard deviation

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<sup>13</sup>Some model specifications only include data from 1990 to 2015, which due to data availability reduces our sample to only 2,019 observations.

<sup>14</sup>For a discussion of how the LHRPS measure is constructed, see Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014) and Fariss (2014b). See results for robustness checks with PTS and CIRI in the attached appendix.

of 1.4 and a mean of 0.45.<sup>15</sup>

## 4.2 Explanatory Variables and Controls

For our main explanatory variables measuring successful and failed coups, we use the Powell and Thyne (2016) dataset on coups. Their dataset classifies all coup-attempts and whether they succeed or fail since 1950. A successful coup is defined as one in which the perpetrators hold on to power for at least seven days.<sup>16</sup>

Since the physical integrity rights and coups literature each show several similar variables are associated with both physical integrity violations and coups, we include these "usual suspects" as possible confounders. We include the natural log of GDP per capita, as measured in 2005 constant dollars and the natural log of population size. We also include binary indicators for the the presence of inter- and intra-state conflict as coded by UCDP (2016). Judicial independence as measured by CIRI, is used as an indicator of strong political institutions which may condition whether coups occur and the extent of physical integrity rights violations (2014). Similarly, physical integrity rights and coups vary by regime type, so we control for regime by employing the Polity IV scores (Jagers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and Jagers 2002; Polity 2012).

Finally, mass mobilizations – violent or nonviolent campaigns – are likely to occur in concert with coups (Johnson and Thyne 2018). We control for the number of protests that occur in the year prior to the coup event, from the Mass Mobilization dataset (Clark and Regan 2016). We disaggregated these into the number of violent and non-violent protests, to control for the regimes' possible repressive response to political violence, following violent protests (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Although we control for mass mobilization, we expect political elites to increase repression to deter collective

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<sup>15</sup>The summary statistics are reported in Table 4 in the Appendix.

<sup>16</sup>Powell and Thyne's 2011 dataset only includes observed coup-attempts. As mentioned above, this sample does not include the possibility of unobserved or closet coups. This is not a problem for our analysis because our theoretical mechanism relies on the elite-bargaining failure being publicly observed. We argue when the elite bargaining failure manifests in a visible display – coup activity – is when we are likely to observe an increase in repression as the elites will repress to deter potential challengers.

action from political opponents, regardless of the level of mass mobilization.<sup>17</sup>

Time trends might bias our findings. We control for this possible bias in two ways. First, to address concerns of differences between Cold War and Post-Cold War periods in regards to coups (Marinov and Goemans 2014), we add a dummy for Cold War.<sup>18</sup> Second, we use a polynomial time trend to account for unobserved trends in respect for physical integrity rights over time (Wooldridge 2015, pg. 365).

### 4.3 Model Specification

We first estimate the model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The specification for the OLS model is given by

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + Coup_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + X_{i,t-1}\phi + t_{i,t-1}\lambda_1 + t_{i,t-1}^2\lambda_2 + t_{i,t-1}^3\lambda_3 + \epsilon_{i,t-1}, \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{i,t}$  is the latent physical integrity rights level for country  $i$  during year  $t$ ;  $\alpha$  is the intercept; the variable of interest,  $Coup_{i,t-1}$  is captured by the coefficient  $\beta_1$ ;  $X_{i,t-1}$  is a vector of time-varying controls captured by the coefficient vector of  $\phi$ ; the  $\lambda$ 's capture any unobserved time trends in the dependent variable<sup>19</sup> and  $\epsilon_{i,t-1}$  represents the error term. We employ Newey-West (HC1) robust standard errors clustered by state to account for unit-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.

One critique of this specification is that there might be unobserved country characteristics conditioning both coup activity and state repression. For robustness, our next specification includes country-year fixed effects to account for this possibility. By employing country fixed effects,  $\alpha_i$ , we control for time-invariant country characteristics that may be correlated with coup activities and physical integrity rights outcomes.<sup>20</sup> We also include year fixed effects,

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<sup>17</sup>Data on mass mobilizations are limited to 1990-2015.

<sup>18</sup>This variable is only included for series with data from prior to the Cold War ending, meaning models that do not include the mass mobilization variable.

<sup>19</sup>for a discussion on the inclusion of quadratic and cubic time trends see (Wooldridge 2015, pg. 365)

<sup>20</sup>We are mainly interested in the within country variation over time. Consequently, fixed effects (FEs) are a more appropriate specification than random effects (REs) models. A Hausman specification rejects the

$\delta_t$ , to capture change in time that is shared/common across all countries.

We exclude the lagged dependent variable for two main reasons. First, theoretically the physical integrity rights conditions of a country are unlikely change significantly from year to year. Physical integrity conditions tend to trend in certain directions over the long run with pivotal events shifting their direction. Similar to Achen’s discussion of state budgets, we should expect the physical integrity rights of the previous year to predict next year’s levels regardless of whether a coup occurred or not (Achen 2001). Second, we exclude a lagged dependent variable to avoid overfitting the model. As Achen (2001) illustrates, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is likely to “destroy the influence of other variables,” biasing the substantive coefficients to negligible results by artificially inflating the lagged dependent variable.<sup>21</sup>

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + Coup_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + X_{i,t-1}\phi + t_{i,t-1}\lambda_1 + t_{i,t-1}^2\lambda_2 + t_{i,t-1}^3\lambda_3 + \epsilon_{i,t-1}, \quad (2)$$

For hypotheses 1, the deterring threats hypothesis, we lag the independent variables by one year. For hypotheses 2, the settling scores hypothesis, we lag the independent variables by two, three and four years.

## 4.4 Results and Analysis

Table 2 shows the result of our test of our first hypothesis (the association between coups, whether they succeed or fail, with respect for physical integrity rights). Odd numbered models utilize the OLS specification, and even numbered models include fixed effects (FE). Models 1-4 test for the association between any type of coup, regardless of whether it suc-

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null hypothesis that random effects is the preferred model.

<sup>21</sup>In the online appendix we include the lagged dependent variable specification, see Table 9. As Achen (2001) would expect, almost all the explanatory variables become statistically insignificant except for the lagged dependent variable due to their high correlation. Importantly, the sign of the main independent variable are consistent with our main results. The explanatory variables which become statistically insignificant include variables that the literature has identified as consistently associated with physical integrity rights conditions such as population, intra-state wars and polity. For robustness, we also include a specification where we use PTS and CIRI lagged, and results remain largely similar to our main models.

ceeded or failed, on repression in the year after the coup-event occurred. Models 1-2 control for the “usual human rights and coups suspects.” Models 3-4 include the previous controls and also includes the number of violent and non-violent protests.<sup>22</sup> We find that any kind of coup in the preceding year is associated with a *decrease* of roughly 0.2 in the latent physical integrity rights score. This result is statistically significant at conventional levels across all four specifications. The decrease in physical integrity rights protection represents almost a quarter of a standard deviation in the physical integrity rights level in the year following a coup. In models 3-4, the count of violent and non-violent protests is associated with deteriorating physical integrity rights levels. However, this result is not statistically significant at conventional levels and adds little explanatory power to the models.

Models 5-8 disaggregate coups into successful and failed ones. As we expected in Hypothesis 1, we find that failed and successful coups are each independently associated with worsening physical integrity rights conditions.<sup>23</sup> In these models, protests are once again statistically insignificant. All the control variables, including the time trends which were excluded from the table for purposes of space, also reach statistical significance in the OLS models except for inter-state war. In the FEs models, accounting for unobserved country and time characteristics leads to some of these controls being statistically insignificant. For robustness we also run similar models using PTS and CIRI aggregated physical integrity rights score. Results remain largely the same.<sup>24</sup>

In Hypothesis 2, we expect to see a divergence in the duration of the retaliatory cycle between successful and failed coups. We expect the duration of repression to persist longer for failed coups, while successful coups may revert to median voter position, and decrease the levels of repression observed in the immediate aftermath. To test these hypotheses we lead the dependent variables by one, two, three and four years. Table 3 reports the results. We control for the same set of variables as in previous models. Models 1-2 lead the dependent

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<sup>22</sup>Including the protest data reduces the number observations to only observations from 1990-2015.

<sup>23</sup>Though surprisingly, successful coups reach statistical significance only in the more rigorous FEs model.

<sup>24</sup>For results see Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix.

variables by one year, reporting the regression results from the OLS and Panel Linear models, similar to Table 2. Models 3-8 lead the dependent variable by 2,3, and 4 years similarly with OLS models in odd numbers and FE in even numbered models. As we expected, and consistent with previous research on the long-term effects of coups on democracy, physical integrity rights conditions deteriorate only in the first year after a successful coup. The results are statistically significant only for the first year after a successful coup, but substantively we see physical integrity rights conditions improving in the following periods.<sup>25</sup> Failed coups on the other hand, are associated with a persistent and lingering deterioration in physical integrity rights conditions. Although the magnitude of the coefficient decreases over time, the relationship remains statistically significant at conventional levels up to four years after the failed coup occurred.

To discuss these results in a substantively meaningful way, we first anchor these results within the range and standard deviations of the LHRPS and then illustrate the magnitude of the effect in changes in respect for physical integrity rights in countries that did not experience a coup.

The LHRPS in our sample, is roughly normally distributed with a mean of 0.45 and a standard deviation of 1.43. In our models, a coup attempt - whether it succeeded or failed - is associated with a deterioration of 0.28 in the LHRPS score (based on Model 2 in Table 2 ). In terms of this variable's standard deviation, this constitutes roughly one fifth of a standard deviation. Failed coups are associated with 0.22 lower LHRPS scores, which constitutes one sixth of a standard deviation, whereas a successful coup is associated with roughly one tenth of a standard deviation's decrease (based on Model 8).<sup>26</sup>

Another way to compare the predicted deterioration in respect for physical integrity rights

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<sup>25</sup>In the OLS models, the sign of the coefficient on successful coups even becomes positive three years after the coup. However, it is not statistically significant, so we can not differentiate the effect from zero.

<sup>26</sup>For a substantive comparison with PTS and CIRI scores see Tables 5 and 6. Following any coup attempt, whether a success or failure, the models find a decrease of roughly 0.8 in respect for physical integrity based on CIRI, which ranges from zero to eight. Similarly, the models find a reduction of roughly 0.3 in PTS scores. Failed coups are associated with a decrease of 0.25 and 0.7 in PTS and CIRI respectively, whereas a successful coups are associated with a 0.35 and 0.7 reduction in respect for physical integrity rights.

following a failed or successful coup, is by illustrating what the associated magnitudes of the LHRPS measure look like in other non-coup related cases. In 2010, for example, Bahrain began to harass political dissidents by performing arbitrary arrests. Moreover, the use of torture became widespread as a tool of political oppression. Prior to this escalation, Bahrain had a relatively decent physical integrity rights record with few systematic infringements on its citizens' physical integrity rights (an average LHRPS score of 1.5 in the previous ten years, roughly two thirds of a standard deviation above the mean score for all countries). After this escalation, both PTS and CIRI measures saw a sharp uptick in the country's state repression/abuse of physical integrity rights scores. The PTS score increased by 2 points while the CIRI score changed by two points as well. This corresponds to Bahrain's LHRPS decrease of 0.56. Comparatively, the results in Model 8 indicate that a successful or failed coup are the equivalent of just under half of the total decline in respect for physical integrity rights that occurred in Bahrain in 2010.

While this may seem to indicate that coups have a substantively small association with the overall respect for physical integrity rights in a country, consider the political turmoil in another case which sharpens these results - Syria. In response to protests against his authoritarian rule in 2011, President Bashar al-Asad and his regime brutally suppressed the civilian population. The civil and political unrest turned from political opposition to armed rebellion as multiple rebel factions emerged to combat the regime, and eventually each other. In the initial two years of the conflict, an estimated 46,000 civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands of Syrians were internally displaced by the conflict. Over this period, Syria's latent rights measure declined by 0.48. Using Model 8, our results indicate that in the year following either a successful coup or a failed coup, each independently results in a deterioration of roughly half of the total decline in respect for physical integrity rights that occurred in Syria over the first two years of its civil war<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>It is important to note that the standards-based physical integrity rights measures (PTS and CIRI) from which the latent measure is constructed, have an upper limit. As a result, when rights violations occur at the highest levels, these measures fail to distinguish between these types of egregious violations.

Table 2: The Relationship between Coups and Respect for Physical Integrity Rights

	<i>Dependent variable = Latent Rights Measure (Fariss)</i>							
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Coup (Fail and Success)	-0.283** (0.112)	-0.275*** (0.083)	-0.254** (0.127)	-0.209*** (0.079)				
Successful Coup					-0.158 (0.147)	-0.238** (0.096)	-0.068 (0.153)	-0.179** (0.077)
Failed Coup					-0.332*** (0.101)	-0.289*** (0.084)	-0.326*** (0.126)	-0.219*** (0.085)
GDP (Log)	0.327*** (0.045)	0.257*** (0.099)	0.340*** (0.045)	0.196** (0.088)	0.328*** (0.045)	0.258*** (0.099)	0.341*** (0.045)	0.199** (0.088)
Population (Log)	-0.608*** (0.069)	-0.264 (0.320)	-0.650*** (0.064)	0.163 (0.324)	-0.608*** (0.069)	-0.263 (0.320)	-0.651*** (0.064)	0.159 (0.324)
Civil War	-0.607*** (0.160)	0.011 (0.028)	-0.444*** (0.131)	0.020 (0.027)	-0.606*** (0.160)	0.012 (0.028)	-0.442*** (0.131)	0.021 (0.027)
Inter-State War	-0.095 (0.168)	-0.030 (0.057)	0.122 (0.121)	0.028 (0.047)	-0.093 (0.168)	-0.029 (0.058)	0.124 (0.121)	0.028 (0.047)
Cold War	-0.153** (0.072)		-0.189*** (0.065)		-0.152** (0.073)		-0.187*** (0.066)	
POLITY IV	0.035*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.007)
Judicial Independence	0.228*** (0.070)	0.128*** (0.047)	0.229*** (0.077)	0.128** (0.052)	0.227*** (0.070)	0.128*** (0.047)	0.228*** (0.077)	0.127** (0.052)
# of Violent Protests			-0.021 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.010)			-0.022 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.009)
# of Non-Violent Protests			-0.012 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.004)			-0.012 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.004)
Constant	2.498*** (0.758)		3.944*** (1.013)		2.498*** (0.758)		3.945*** (1.015)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	3,034	3,034	2,019	2,019	3,034	3,034	2,019	2,019
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.584	0.103	0.638	0.078	0.584	0.104	0.638	0.079

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. The dependent variable is the Latent Human Rights Measure. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by 1 year. Two-tailed significance levels are: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 3: Temporal Variation in Coups and Physical Integrity Rights

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Latent Rights Measure (t+1)		Latent Rights Measure (t+2)		Latent Rights Measure (t+3)		Latent Rights Measure (t+4)	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Successful Coup	-0.069 (0.152)	-0.179** (0.074)	-0.007 (0.171)	-0.119 (0.074)	0.021 (0.184)	-0.114 (0.075)	0.127 (0.186)	-0.023 (0.076)
Failed Coup	-0.335*** (0.125)	-0.219*** (0.059)	-0.361** (0.143)	-0.242*** (0.059)	-0.330** (0.149)	-0.209*** (0.060)	-0.275* (0.152)	-0.148** (0.061)
GDP (Log)	0.342*** (0.045)	0.199*** (0.037)	0.346*** (0.045)	0.150*** (0.037)	0.350*** (0.045)	0.111*** (0.037)	0.356*** (0.045)	0.103*** (0.038)
Population (Log)	-0.650*** (0.064)	0.159 (0.137)	-0.660*** (0.064)	0.072 (0.137)	-0.670*** (0.064)	-0.008 (0.138)	-0.680*** (0.064)	-0.090 (0.140)
Civil War	-0.446*** (0.131)	0.021 (0.030)	-0.430*** (0.133)	0.022 (0.030)	-0.420*** (0.134)	0.011 (0.030)	-0.400*** (0.134)	0.009 (0.030)
Inter-State War	0.119 (0.122)	0.028 (0.053)	0.084 (0.116)	0.017 (0.053)	0.066 (0.114)	0.034 (0.053)	0.025 (0.115)	0.015 (0.054)
POLITY IV	0.034*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.015*** (0.003)
Judicial Independence	0.221*** (0.077)	0.127*** (0.023)	0.205*** (0.076)	0.121*** (0.023)	0.189** (0.075)	0.113*** (0.024)	0.172** (0.075)	0.103*** (0.024)
# of Violent Protests	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.013** (0.006)
# of Non-Violent Protests	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.001 (0.003)
Constant	3.934*** (0.997)		4.077*** (1.022)		4.211*** (1.034)		4.278*** (1.011)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.637	0.079	0.642	0.064	0.644	0.046	0.646	0.033

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. The dependent variable is the Latent Human Rights Measure. All explanatory and control variables are held constant at time  $t$ . Two-tailed significance levels are: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

## 5 Conclusion

This study makes several contributions. Theoretically, we argue that uncertainty and bargaining breakdown between elites typify the coup-environment. These dynamics result in shocks to the political status quo generating political instability. We argue that the incomplete information and political instability are likely to deteriorate respect for physical integrity rights.

We posit two theoretical mechanisms that link bargaining failure within the ruling coalition to state repression/physical integrity rights abuses: first, coup-winners are likely to preemptively increase repression as signal of control and strength to *deter threats* from would-be political challengers. Second, after a coup, the coup-beneficiaries are likely to use the shock to the status quo as an opportunity to *settle scores*. As illustrated by Turkey’s coup in 2016, coup activity can lead to both elite and mass purges. Although score-settling is likely after any coup attempt – failures and successes – the cycle of retaliation will be longer after a coup failure, as leaders use coups as justification to settle scores with political opponents including professors, activists, journalists, judges, members of opposition parties, as well as, military leaders.

Empirically, this study contributes the first quantitative analysis of the relationship to coups and physical integrity rights. This study is only a first step in considering how coups influence more redistributive politics. Future research should consider the effects of coups on an array of other policy indicators, including civil and political rights, economic growth, trade flows, and foreign direct investment as well as such social provisions as access to health care and education. We prioritize the relationship between coups and physical integrity rights to speak to the literature on authoritarian institutions, human rights, and coups. Our results are robust across several model specifications, additional controls, and alternative measures for physical integrity rights/state repression.

Practically, our study offers several implications for policymakers. Recent work by economists and political scientists have suggested that coups may be “good-news” for de-

mocratization. Given the international pressure for countries to hold “democratic” elections, a more thorough exploration of the influence of coups on domestic politics is necessary before this risky endeavour is championed. We are concerned that post-coup elections could be a form of international cheap talk. Security forces are both the coup entrepreneurs and the agents of repression, so considering the relationship between coups and physical integrity rights violations seems the appropriate place to start. By focusing on within-country respect for physical integrity rights we are able to assess whether coups are in fact good news for human rights. Our results suggest that any coup activity is likely to lead to a decrease in respect for physical integrity rights. Our findings show that the cycle of retaliation has a longer duration after coup failure. Given the uncertainty about coup failure or success, we are skeptical that “smart power would try to harness the fear of a coup as a force for good” (Collier 2008). Coups can remove leaders from power, even when the people lack direct accountability through the ballot box. However, this does little to improve the physical integrity rights of civilians.

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## 6 Appendix

**Word Count: 1,480**

Table 4 presents summary statistics of variables included in the main results. Tables 5 and 6 replicate Table 2 using the CIRI Physical Integrity Measure and PTS, instead of the Fariss Latent Variable Measure. Please note that the PTS Measure has been recoded such that a higher score reflect *more* respect for human rights. Similarly, Tables 7 and 8 replicate Table 3 using the same alternative measures.

Table 4: Summary Statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Latent Rights Measure (Fariss)	0.452	1.434	-3.112	4.705
Coup (Success or Fail)	0.028	0.165	0	1
Successful Coup	0.014	0.117	0	1
Failed Coup	0.016	0.124	0	1
GDP (ln)	23.118	2.508	15.993	30.523
Population (ln)	15.237	2.207	8.876	21.039
Civil War	0.170	0.376	0	1
Inter State War	0.031	0.174	0	1
Cold War	0.396	0.489	0	1
POLITY IV	1.652	7.275	-10	10
Judicial Independence	1.137	0.796	0	2
# of Violent Protests	0.818	1.907	0	41
# of Non-Violent Protests	2.194	4.582	0	102

Table 5: The Relationship between Coups and Respect for Human Rights - CIRI

	<i>Dependent variable = CIRI - Physical Integrity (Respect)</i>							
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Coup (Fail and Success)	-0.756*** (0.266)	-0.820*** (0.225)	-0.735*** (0.273)	-0.550*** (0.201)				
Successful Coup					-0.579 (0.365)	-0.853*** (0.296)	-0.625* (0.361)	-0.700*** (0.253)
Failed Coup					-0.867*** (0.248)	-0.801*** (0.218)	-0.754*** (0.266)	-0.499** (0.206)
GDP (ln)	0.396*** (0.073)	0.066 (0.140)	0.423*** (0.078)	0.096 (0.188)	0.396*** (0.073)	0.359* (0.194)	0.422*** (0.077)	0.098 (0.188)
Population (ln)	-0.941*** (0.104)	-1.556*** (0.476)	-1.043*** (0.113)	0.841 (0.739)	-0.942*** (0.104)	-0.441 (0.551)	-1.043*** (0.113)	0.840 (0.738)
Civil War	-1.084*** (0.262)	0.115 (0.094)	-0.869*** (0.249)	0.107 (0.116)	-1.082*** (0.263)	0.107 (0.095)	-0.867*** (0.250)	0.111 (0.117)
Inter-State War	-0.229 (0.231)	0.059 (0.126)	0.013 (0.214)	0.075 (0.150)	-0.227 (0.231)	0.082 (0.132)	0.013 (0.213)	0.071 (0.149)
Cold War	0.227 (0.142)		-0.034 (0.122)		0.229 (0.142)		-0.028 (0.121)	
POLITY IV	0.056*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.013)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.013)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.064*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.020)
Judicial Independence	0.512*** (0.137)	0.373*** (0.110)	0.513*** (0.161)	0.321*** (0.120)	0.510*** (0.137)	0.373*** (0.112)	0.513*** (0.161)	0.321*** (0.121)
# of Violent Protests			-0.028 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.029)			-0.028 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.029)
# of Non-Violent Protests			-0.003 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.008)			-0.003 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.008)
Constant	10.056*** (1.230)		11.056*** (1.277)		10.067*** (1.230)		11.066*** (1.278)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	3,008	3,008	2,011	2,011	3,008	3,008	2,011	2,011
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.063	0.514	0.045	0.454	0.063	0.514	0.047

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. The dependent variable is the CIRI Physical Integrity Measure. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by 1 year. Two-tailed significance levels are: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 6: The Relationship between Coups and Respect for Human Rights - PTS (Relevelled; High Score = Respect)

	<i>Dependent variable = PTS - (Respect)</i>							
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Coup (Success and Failure)	-0.273** (0.115)	-0.284*** (0.099)	-0.334** (0.136)	-0.195* (0.105)				
Successful Coup					-0.297** (0.150)	-0.356*** (0.123)	-0.384* (0.200)	-0.336 (0.253)
Failed Coup					-0.239** (0.103)	-0.227** (0.094)	-0.249** (0.121)	-0.107 (0.206)
GDP (ln)	0.229*** (0.033)	0.049 (0.078)	0.258*** (0.033)	0.234** (0.117)	0.229*** (0.033)	0.222* (0.115)	0.258*** (0.033)	0.233 (0.188)
Population (ln)	-0.454*** (0.050)	-1.214*** (0.275)	-0.520*** (0.050)	0.236 (0.399)	-0.454*** (0.050)	-0.525* (0.303)	-0.521*** (0.050)	0.241 (0.738)
Civil War	-0.606*** (0.127)	0.006 (0.042)	-0.483*** (0.124)	0.005 (0.051)	-0.606*** (0.127)	-0.007 (0.044)	-0.485*** (0.124)	0.005 (0.117)
Inter-State War	0.002 (0.149)	-0.011 (0.059)	0.224* (0.116)	0.051 (0.077)	0.001 (0.149)	-0.030 (0.064)	0.222* (0.115)	0.047 (0.149)
Cold War	0.222*** (0.071)		0.077 (0.071)		0.221*** (0.071)		0.078 (0.071)	
POLITY IV	0.022*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.029 (0.020)
Judicial Independence	0.263*** (0.059)	0.161*** (0.053)	0.241*** (0.070)	0.119* (0.065)	0.263*** (0.059)	0.161*** (0.052)	0.242*** (0.070)	0.120 (0.121)
# of Violent Protests			-0.004 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.014)			-0.004 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.029)
# of Non-Violent Protests			0.0005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)			0.0004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
Constant	5.111*** (0.631)		5.503*** (0.655)		5.114*** (0.631)		5.506*** (0.656)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	2,981	2,981	2,010	2,010	2,981	2,981	2,010	2,010
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.463	0.081	0.505	0.036	0.463	0.057	0.505	0.038

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. The dependent variable is the PTS Measure. Note that the PTS measure has been re-levelled, such that a higher score reflects *more* respect for human rights. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by 1 year. Two-tailed significance levels are: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 7: Temporal Variation in Coups and Human Rights - CIRI (Respect)

	<i>Dependent variable: CIRI (Respect)</i>							
	CIRI t+1		CIRI t+2		CIRI t+3		CIRI t+4	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Successful Coup	-0.626* (0.361)	-0.700*** (0.265)	0.033 (0.374)	-0.162 (0.261)	0.021 (0.421)	-0.308 (0.256)	0.470 (0.364)	0.228 (0.261)
Failed Coup	-0.757*** (0.267)	-0.499** (0.207)	-0.836** (0.331)	-0.597*** (0.206)	-0.925*** (0.341)	-0.677*** (0.202)	-0.273 (0.342)	0.006 (0.201)
GDP (ln)	0.423*** (0.077)	0.098 (0.128)	0.429*** (0.075)	0.057 (0.127)	0.427*** (0.074)	-0.075 (0.125)	0.447*** (0.074)	0.127 (0.124)
Population (ln)	-1.044*** (0.113)	0.840* (0.475)	-1.058*** (0.111)	0.519 (0.468)	-1.069*** (0.106)	0.195 (0.459)	-1.104*** (0.107)	0.080 (0.456)
Civil War	-0.868*** (0.249)	0.111 (0.104)	-0.843*** (0.243)	0.052 (0.103)	-0.850*** (0.243)	-0.013 (0.101)	-0.764*** (0.241)	0.072 (0.100)
Inter-State War	0.013 (0.214)	0.071 (0.186)	-0.273 (0.224)	-0.168 (0.181)	-0.158 (0.260)	0.131 (0.178)	-0.368* (0.211)	-0.140 (0.177)
POLITY IV	0.064*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.066*** (0.013)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.011)
Judicial Independence	0.510*** (0.159)	0.321*** (0.082)	0.470*** (0.154)	0.230*** (0.080)	0.419*** (0.148)	0.160** (0.079)	0.404*** (0.145)	0.151* (0.079)
# of Violent Protests	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.029 (0.035)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.037* (0.019)
# of Non-Violent Protests	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.002 (0.018)	0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.009)
Constant	11.065*** (1.276)		11.180*** (1.233)		11.443*** (1.210)		11.526*** (1.198)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	2,011	2,011	2,009	2,009	2,008	2,008	2,008	2,008
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.514	0.047	0.520	0.027	0.526	0.020	0.531	0.011

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. The dependent variable is the CIRI Physical Integrity Measure. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by 1 year. Two-tailed significance levels are: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 8: Temporal Variation in Coups and Human Rights - PTS (Respect)

	<i>Dependent variable: PTS (Respect)</i>							
	PTS t+1		PTS t+2		PTS t+3		PTS t+4	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
Successful Coup	-0.382* (0.200)	-0.336*** (0.125)	-0.058 (0.239)	0.022 (0.123)	-0.267 (0.211)	-0.244** (0.122)	0.056 (0.245)	-0.017 (0.122)
Failed Coup	-0.240* (0.122)	-0.107 (0.099)	-0.350* (0.199)	-0.194* (0.099)	-0.231 (0.176)	-0.099 (0.098)	-0.342 (0.213)	-0.246** (0.097)
GDP (ln)	0.257*** (0.032)	0.233*** (0.062)	0.267*** (0.033)	0.213*** (0.061)	0.270*** (0.033)	0.136** (0.061)	0.281*** (0.034)	0.146** (0.060)
Population (ln)	-0.520*** (0.050)	0.241 (0.230)	-0.528*** (0.051)	0.183 (0.226)	-0.530*** (0.050)	0.047 (0.225)	-0.538*** (0.051)	-0.249 (0.224)
Civil War	-0.482*** (0.124)	0.005 (0.050)	-0.438*** (0.126)	0.045 (0.049)	-0.455*** (0.126)	-0.034 (0.049)	-0.403*** (0.127)	-0.010 (0.049)
Inter-State War	0.223* (0.114)	0.047 (0.089)	0.157 (0.117)	0.023 (0.087)	0.104 (0.129)	0.031 (0.087)	0.058 (0.106)	0.028 (0.087)
POLITY IV	0.023*** (0.007)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.011** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)
Judicial Independence	0.250*** (0.068)	0.120*** (0.039)	0.220*** (0.069)	0.103*** (0.039)	0.213*** (0.067)	0.116*** (0.038)	0.195*** (0.066)	0.075* (0.038)
# of Violent Protests	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.017)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.009)
# of Non-Violent Protests	0.0004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.004)
Constant	5.508*** (0.656)		5.424*** (0.650)		5.396*** (0.623)		5.255*** (0.604)	
Fixed Effects		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	2,010	2,010	2,012	2,012	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.505	0.038	0.505	0.026	0.507	0.015	0.513	0.010

*Notes:* OLS regression and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the odd number columns. Fixed-effects OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses reported in the even number columns. The dependent variable is the PTS Measure.

Note that the PTS measure has been re-leveled, such that a higher score reflects *more* respect for human rights. Country-specific and year-specific fixed effects not reported. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by 1 year. Two-tailed significance levels are: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

## 7 Online Appendix

In Table 9 below we demonstrate how including the LHRPS as a lagged dependent variable "destroys the influence of other variable" (Achen 2001). Model 1 includes the standard controls and the main lagged dependent variable, with country-year fixed effects. Notice that not only are coups statistically insignificant, almost all the control variables become statistically insignificant as well, where we would expect them to be statistically significant based on the literature on physical integrity violations (Poe and Tate (1994); ?). Models 2 and 3 include failed and successful coups, instead of any coup, with additional controls in model 3. While the adjusted R-squared is very high, it nullifies the statistical significance on almost all other control variables.

In Models 4-9 we replicate these results by lagging PTS (Models 4-6) and CIRI (Models 7-9). Notice that PTS and CIRI, which are similar to the LHRPS substantively, are statistically significant but the main independent variables - coups, success and failure, are in the correct direction every time, and are often statistically significant.

Table 9: Including Lagged DV

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	LHRPS								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
LHRPS (lagged)	0.952*** (0.006)	0.952*** (0.006)	0.887*** (0.014)						
PTS (lagged)				0.468*** (0.023)	0.468*** (0.023)	0.309*** (0.009)			
CIRI (lagged)							0.213*** (0.012)	0.213*** (0.012)	0.145*** (0.009)
Coup (Fail and Success)	-0.017 (0.023)			-0.136*** (0.052)			-0.086 (0.055)		
Successful Coup		-0.052 (0.034)	0.0002 (0.051)		-0.205*** (0.061)	-0.090 (0.078)		-0.081 (0.088)	-0.039 (0.078)
Failed Coup		0.006 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.031)		-0.077 (0.053)	-0.094 (0.069)		-0.080 (0.052)	-0.114* (0.069)
GDP (Log)	-0.028* (0.016)	-0.028* (0.016)	-0.036 (0.026)	0.087* (0.046)	0.088* (0.046)	0.086 (0.068)	0.080 (0.059)	0.080 (0.059)	0.151** (0.068)
Population (Log)	-0.008 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.040)	-0.030 (0.083)	-0.152 (0.230)	-0.152 (0.230)	0.101 (0.244)	-0.188 (0.247)	-0.187 (0.247)	0.115 (0.244)
Civil War	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.003 (0.019)	0.013 (0.024)	0.014 (0.024)	0.022 (0.028)	0.003 (0.024)	0.004 (0.024)	0.003 (0.028)
Inter-state War	0.017 (0.013)	0.016 (0.012)	0.009 (0.016)	0.031 (0.032)	0.029 (0.032)	0.055 (0.044)	-0.044 (0.054)	-0.044 (0.054)	0.022 (0.044)
POLITY IV			0.004 (0.003)			0.016*** (0.005)			0.013** (0.005)
Judicial Independence			0.015 (0.015)			0.091** (0.040)			0.076* (0.040)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,629	3,629	2,080	3,494	3,494	2,054	3,061	3,061	2,078
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.904	0.904	0.810	0.428	0.429	0.282	0.378	0.378	0.259

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01